'Two captains commanding one ship make it sink'. Intra-elite rivalry and Mass Violence in Sudan. by Johnson, Rory
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 1	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
‘Two	captains	commanding	one	ship	make	it	sink’	
Intra-elite	rivalry	and	Mass	Violence	in	Sudan	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Rory	Johnson	
Leiden	University	
S1893769	
r.a.johnson@umail.leidenuniv.nl	
	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 2	
Table	of	Contents	
1.	 List	of	Abbreviations	..........................................................................................................	3	
2.	 Introduction	.......................................................................................................................	4	
2.1.	 Definitions	and	quantitative	justifications	......................................................................	6	
3.	 Existing	explanations	for	mass	indiscriminate	violence	.......................................................	7	
3.1.	 Leader	ideology	.............................................................................................................	8	
3.2.	 Outgroup	threat	.............................................................................................................	9	
3.3.	 Two	theories	of	intra-elite	rivalry	.................................................................................	11	
3.3.1.	 Roessler:	The	Coup-Civil	War	Trap	...........................................................................	12	
3.3.2.	 Van	der	Maat:	Genocidal	Consolidation	...................................................................	13	
3.4.	 Resource	competition	..................................................................................................	14	
4.	 Research	Design	...............................................................................................................	15	
4.1.	 Observable	Implications	...............................................................................................	16	
4.1.1.	 Leader	Ideology	.......................................................................................................	16	
4.1.2.	 Outgroup	Threat	......................................................................................................	18	
4.1.3.	 Intra-elite	rivalry	......................................................................................................	19	
5.	 Case	Analysis	...................................................................................................................	21	
5.1.	 Defining	the	elite:	the	social	strata	of	Sudan	................................................................	22	
5.2.	 1989	coup	and	the	rise	of	the	National	Islamic	Front	and	Hassan	al-Turabi	..................	22	
5.3.	 Bashir	versus	Turabi;	the	struggle	for	control	...............................................................	23	
5.4.	 Islamism	in	Darfur	and	the	Justice	and	Equality	Movement	(JEM)	................................	27	
5.5.	 2001-2003:	how	and	why	inaction	was	replaced	by	mass	indiscriminate	violence.	.......	30	
5.6.	 SLA	and	a	reactive	counter-insurgency	.........................................................................	32	
6.	 Summary	of	observations	................................................................................................	35	
7.	 Conclusion	.......................................................................................................................	37	
8.	 Reference	List	..................................................................................................................	40	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 3	
	
1. List	of	Abbreviations	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
CMR	 	 Crude	Mortality	Rate	
CPA	 	 Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	
DUP	 	 Democratic	Unionist	Party	
GoS	 	 Government	of	Sudan	
ICF	 	 Islamic	Charter	Front	
IDPs	 	 Internally	Displaced	Persons	
JEM	 	 Justice	and	Equality	Movement	
MSF	 	 Médicins	Sans	Frontières	
NCP	 	 National	Congress	Party	
NGO	 	 Non-Governmental	Organisation	
NIF	 	 National	Islamic	Front	
PAIC	 	 Popular	Arab	and	Islamic	Conference		
PNC	 	 Popular	National	Congress		
RCC	 	 Revolutionary	Command	Council	
SAF	 	 Sudanese	Armed	Forces	
SLA	 	 Sudan	Liberation	Army	
SPLA	 	 Sudan	People’s	Liberation	Army	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 4	
2. Introduction	
	
	
The	UN	estimates	that	as	many	as	300,000	civilians	are	believed	to	have	perished	in	the	Darfur	
region	of	Sudan	since	2004,	and	the	instability	in	the	region	remains	unresolved	to	this	day.1	
The	precursors	to	an	impending	catastrophe	in	this	marginalised	province	had	been	evident	
but	the	global	community	was	not	looking.2	Attention	was	focused	instead	on	the	ongoing	
efforts	to	broker	a	peace	deal	to	end	the	persistent	violence	that	had	afflicted	the	country	
along	its	north-south	axis.	By	the	time	that	significant	attention	was	directed	towards	Darfur,	
the	focus	settled	on	the	consequences	rather	than	the	root	causes	of	the	unrest.	Efforts	were	
understandably	focused	on	how	to	get	immediate	and	essential	humanitarian	assistance	into	
this	 geographically	 isolated	 region	as	well	 as	 seeking	ways	 to	quickly	 reduce	 the	 levels	of	
violence.	Given	that	 the	region	was	known	to	have	been	historically	afflicted	by	perennial	
periods	of	instability,	this	led	to	early	interpretations	that	this	conflagration	was	just	the	latest	
instalment	of	a	cyclical	pattern	of	brutality.		
There	 was	 a	 tendency	 to	 anchor	 explanations	 around	 the	 supposed	 watershed	
moment	 of	 February	 2003,	 when	 fighters	 representing	 the	 Sudan	 Liberation	 Army	 (SLA)	
conducted	their	first	significant	attack	against	a	government	base	in	Golo.3	The	contention	is	
that,	 in	 imposing	 this	 chronologically	 limited	 lens,	 earlier	 causal	 mechanisms	 have	 been	
overlooked.	Furthermore,	the	tendency	to	use	the	term	‘counterinsurgency’	when	describing	
the	subsequent	violence	meted	out	by	government	forces	and	their	affiliates,	may	also	be	
misrepresentative.	 Favouring	 the	 term	 counterinsurgency,	 suggests	 that	 Bashir’s	 actions	
were	 reactive.	 The	unspoken	political	 rationale	 for	 this	 at	 the	 time	was	 that	 international	
negotiators	did	not	want	to	jeopardise	the	legitimacy	of	the	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	
(CPA)	talks.	Although	widespread	international	condemnation	did	materialise	over	the	way	
the	government	undertook	its	military	campaign	in	Darfur,	there	remained	a	reluctance	to	
discuss	whether	 the	 causes	of	 the	 violence	may	have	been	 the	 result	of	 events	occurring	
																																																						
1	UNICEF,	Darfur-overview,	
https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html,	(viewed	on	
28/06/2017).	
2	See	Reeves	2007.	
3	In	his	edited	work,	War	in	Darfur	and	the	Search	for	Peace	Alex	de	Waal	shows	with	
examples	how	often	this	event	has	been	used	as	an	all	too	convenient	starting	point.	
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within	 Khartoum.	 A	 further	 explanation	 for	 this	 can	 be	 found	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 evolving	
academic	interpretations	of	periods	of	mass	violence.		
The	nature	of	conflict	has	changed	dramatically	over	the	past	half-century	with	intra-
state	conflict	replacing	inter-state	conflict	as	the	most	prevalent	form	of	violence	worldwide.4	
Although	academic	appraisals	have	in	many	ways	adapted	in	response	to	this,	the	belief	that	
periods	of	violence	 lead	to	heightened	 levels	of	 risk	and	 instability	 for	 incumbent	regimes	
remained	 widely	 accepted.	 Recently,	 Van	 der	 Maat	 has	 challenged	 this	 consensus	 by	
evidencing	 the	 number	 of	 occasions	 when	 mass	 violence	 appears	 to	 have	 occurred	 in	
conjunction	with	high	levels	of	 intra-regime	instability.	He	raises	a	valid	query	that	 if	mass	
violence	 only	 produces	 negative	 consequences	 why	 does	 it	 so	 often	 occur	 when	 leaders	
appear	most	vulnerable?	Looking	in	detail	at	the	case	of	the	1994	Rwandan	genocide	he	offers	
an	original	 interpretation	that	mass	violence	may	 in	fact	be	perpetrated	 intentionally	by	a	
leader	to	resolve	an	intra-elite	crisis.5		
The	aspirations	of	this	piece	are	twofold.	Broadly,	it	will	offer	a	reassessment	of	the	
causes	 of	 the	 violence	 within	 Darfur,	 a	 topic	 that,	 as	 explained	 above,	 calls	 for	 further	
attention	to	avoid	being	overlooked	and	possibly	misrepresented.		More	specifically,	it	will	
seek	 to	 scrutinise	 Van	 der	Maat’s	 newly	 proposed	 explanation	 for	 the	 outbreak	 of	mass	
indiscriminate	violence	alongside	pre-existing	rival	explanations.	At	first	glance	the	Darfurian	
case	 offers	 the	 potential	 to	 extrapolate	 this	 theoretical	model	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 both	 the	
model	 itself	 and	 our	 overall	 appreciation	 of	 the	 case.	With	 a	 new	 campaign,	 once	 again	
targeting	non-combatants,	having	been	launched	by	President	Omar	al-Bashir	as	recently	as	
January	3rd	20156	such	a	re-evaluation	remains	both	highly	relevant	and	necessary.	In	view	of	
all	this,	this	paper	will	attempt	to	answer	the	following	research	question:		
	
To	what	extent	did	the	mass	killings	in	Darfur	derive	from	an	intra-elite	rivalry?	
	
																																																						
4	See	Fearon	and	Laitin	2003;	Collier,	Hoeffler	and	Rohner	2009;	and	Kaldor	2012.	
5	See	Van	der	Maat	2015.	
6	Sauve,	‘One	at	a	Time:	The	Forgotten	Genocide	in	Darfur’,	Africa,	Foreign	Affairs,	
http://mindthismagazine.com/one-at-a-time-the-forgotten-genocide-in-darfur/	
(02/04/2015)	(viewed	on	18/12/2016).	
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2.1. Definitions	and	quantitative	justifications	
	
Since	the	US	Secretary	of	State,	Colin	Powell,	used	the	term	‘genocide’	to	describe	the	killings	
in	 Darfur7	 this	 has	 been	 incorporated	 into	 common	 parlance	 when	 talking	 about	 the	
humanitarian	crisis	in	Darfur.	In	1948,	the	United	Nations	defined	genocide	as	follows;	‘acts	
committed	with	intent	to	destroy,	in	whole	or	in	part,	a	national,	ethnical,	racial,	or	religious	
group.’8	The	term’s	appeal	derives	from	the	distinct	legal	and	political	ramifications	which	its	
usage	 engenders.	 However,	 we	 should	 be	 cautious	 in	 applying	 this	 terminology	 to	 the	
situation	in	Darfur.	As	opposed	to	the	civil	wars	in	the	south	of	the	country9	where	there	was	
a	much	clearer	ethnic	and	religious	divide	between	Muslim,	Arab	‘northerners’	and	Christian,	
African	 ‘southerners’,	 Darfur	 fulfils	 the	 cliché	 of	 African	 complexities.	 Darfur	 has	
approximately	 eighty	 different	 ethnic	 groups10	 which	 have	 been	 interwoven	 through	
marriage	to	distort	the	commonly	presented	dichotomy	of	‘Arab’	tribes	against	‘African’	ones.	
To	 avoid	 this	 paper	 deviating	 into	 a	 debate	 over	 semantics,	 the	 term	 ‘mass’	 violence	 is	
preferred	 over	 ‘genocidal’	 violence.	 This	 aims	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 complexity,	 whilst	 not	
demeaning	the	severity	of	the	issue	at	hand.		
What	 justification	 is	 there	to	claim	that	the	violence	 in	the	Darfur	was	massive?	 In	
periods	of	intra-state	crisis	such	as	the	one	witnessed	within	Darfur,	attacks	against	civilians	
do	not	always	result	in	death,	and	a	lot	of	the	civilian	deaths	are	not	caused	by	direct	physical	
attacks.11	For	this	reason,	it	can	often	be	misleading	to	utilise	narrow	quantitative	statistics	
such	as	battle	deaths	to	determine	the	scale	of	any	given	period	of	intra-state	violence.	In	
Darfur,	observers	have	found	 it	extremely	difficult	 to	determine	accurately	 the	number	of	
civilian	 victims	 due	 to	 the	 inaccessibility	 of	 the	 region.	 The	 French	 NGO,	 Médicins	 sans	
Frontières	 (MSF),	made	 the	 first	attempt	 to	conduct	a	comprehensive	mortality	 survey	by	
																																																						
7	Secretary	Powell	made	this	pronouncement	on	September	9th,	2004	and	it	was	later	
echoed	by	President	George	W.	Bush.		
8	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	Genocide,	New	York,	9th	
December	1948,	United	Nations	Treaty	Series,	(available	from	
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf)	
9	First	Sudanese	Civil	War	(1955-1972)	and	Second	Sudanese	Civil	war	(1983-2005).	
10	Fouad,	‘Introduction	to	the	Conflict	in	the	Darfur/	West	Sudan’	in	Ardenne-van	der	
Hoeven,	Mohamed,	Grono,	and	Mendez,	(eds.),	Explaining	Darfur:	Four	Lectures	on	the	
Ongoing	Genocide,	(Amsterdam,	2006),	eBook	Collection	(EBSCOhost)	(viewed	on	
18/12/2016).	
11	See	Rummel	1994.	
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carrying	out	research	in	four	Internally	Displaced	Persons	(IDP)	camps	between	April	and	June	
2004.	They	calculated	that	civilians	faced	an	estimated	Crude	Mortality	Rate	(CMR)	of	7.5612	
before	they	reached	the	IDP	camps	which	fell	to	the,	still	unacceptably	high,	rate	of	2.35	once	
they	were	within	 the	 camps.13	 Though	physical	 violence	was	not	 the	 cause	of	 the	deaths	
within	the	IDP	camps,	they	were	the	direct	result	of	deliberate	policies	to	restrict	supplies	of	
food	and	aid	assistance	and	therefore	 they	should	be	viewed	together	with	battle-related	
deaths.	Taking	the	CMR	rates	of	MSF	and	extrapolating	them	throughout	the	region	of	Darfur	
we	reach	a	figure	of	around	150,000	civilian	deaths	for	the	period	of	March	2004-	June	2004	
alone.	
	
3. Existing	explanations	for	mass	indiscriminate	violence	
	
Although	 incidences	 of	 mass	 violence	 have	 occurred	 throughout	 recorded	 history,	 the	
theoretical	analysis	of	their	occurrence	has	only	recently	broadened	from	a	relatively	narrow	
avenue	of	interpretation.	Traditionally,	civilian	deaths	were	often	seen	to	be	an	unfortunate	
and	unavoidable	consequence	of	warfare.	When	it	became	impossible	to	ignore	the	obvious	
intentionality	behind	certain	episodes	of	mass	violence,	the	unpalatable	nature	of	the	topic	
continued	to	dissuade	commentators	from	considering	rational	state-led	explanations	for	this	
morally	repugnant	behaviour.	Instead	it	was	seen	to	be	an	extreme	expression	of	primordial	
hatreds	 between	 tribal	 groups,	 and	 along	 ethnoregional	 lines,	 emanating	 from	
uncontrollable,	individualistic,	subconscious	inclinations.14		
Such	 ingrained	 societal	divisions	are	deemed	 to	be	exacerbated	 if	 the	 state	within	
which	they	are	witnessed	is	‘financially,	bureaucratically,	and	militarily	weak.’15	This	perceived	
correlation	led	to	the	development	of	the	weak	state	paradigm.16	However,	in	the	words	of	
Roessler	 this	 theoretical	 interpretation	 relies	 too	heavily	on	 ‘deterministic	 logic’17	and	 the	
																																																						
12	7.56	deaths	per	10,000/day.	The	accepted	international	CMR	benchmark	for	an	
emergency	stands	at	1	death	per	10,000/	day.	
13	See	Hagan	and	Rymond-Richmond	2008.	
14	See	Kaplan	1993.	
15	Fearon	and	Laitin,	‘Ethnicity,	Insurgency,	and	Civil	War’,	American	Political	Science	Review,	
(Vol.	97:1,	2003),	p.	88.	
16	See	Fearon	and	Laitin	2003;	Collier	et	al.	2003;	and	Collier,	Hoeffler	and	Rohner	2009.	
17	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa:	The	Logic	of	the	Coup-Civil	War	Trap,	
(Cambridge,	2016),	p.	9.		
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limitations	 in	 terms	 of	 comparative	 process	 tracing	 with	 this	 perspective	 were	 quickly	
demonstrated.	Certainly,	whilst	most	episodes	of	mass	violence	have	occurred	in	weak	states	
with	a	degree	of	ethnic	diversity	this	does	not	mean	that	the	existence	of	such	conditions	
should	foster	a	sense	of	pessimistic	inevitability.	There	are	also	many	states	characterized	by	
diverse	ethnical	mixes	and	debilitating	structural	conditions	which	have	not	witnessed	violent	
episodes.18	 If	we	are	 to	discredit	 these	defunct	 interpretations	what	 then	has	emerged	to	
replace	them?		
Recently,	 there	has	been	a	move	away	 from	 the	 interpretation	 that	mass	 violence	
results	 from	uncontrollable	anarchistic	conditions	and	 instead	 the	agency	of	 the	state	has	
been	 reassessed.	 In	 focusing	 on	 state	 power	 these	 new	 theoretical	 approaches	 are	
fundamentally	Hobbesian.19		Rather	than	perceiving	the	state	to	be	defunct	and	reactionary,	
academics	 have	 come	 to	 argue	 that	 in	 many	 instances	 of	 mass	 intra-state	 violence	 the	
political	elite	are	able	to	maintain	a	significant,	if	somewhat	concentrated,	degree	of	power.	
This	has	encouraged	the	development	of	several	state-led	interpretations	of	the	outbreak	and	
perpetuation	of	mass	violence	which	sought	to	 improve	upon	the	aforementioned	macro-
level	interpretations	that	could	predict	which	countries	were	more	vulnerable,	but	could	not	
sufficiently	explain	why	only	a	few	of	these	countries	experienced	periods	of	mass	violence.20	
Three	 possible	 explanations	 were	 given	 as	 to	 why	 state	 leaders	may	 choose	 to	 instigate	
periods	 of	 mass	 violence	 against	 their	 own	 citizens:	 1)	 to	 propagate	 and	 strengthen	 an	
ideological	belief;	2)	in	response	to	an	outgroup	threat;	and	3)	to	resolve	an	elite	rivalry	crisis.	
Let	us	expand	further	on	the	key	propositions	of	each	of	these.	
	
3.1. Leader	ideology	
	
Extreme	leader	ideology	posits	that	leaders	will	use	mass	violence	as	a	mechanism	by	which	
to	achieve	adherence	amongst	their	citizens	to	a	determined	ideology.	Valentino,	a	leading	
proponent	 of	 this	 view,	 presents	 a	 strong	 case	 for	 how	 efforts	 to	 impose	 communist	
ideologies	in	the	Soviet	Union,	China	and	Cambodia,	directly	led	to	the	mass	killings	of	civilians	
																																																						
18	See	Cheeseman	2015.	
19	See	Roessler	2016.	
20	See	Roessler	2016;	and	Kalyvas	2006.	
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in	these	countries.21	Rather	than	being	an	opportunistic	method	to	maintain	political	power,	
Valentino	argues	that	political	ideas	and	ideologies	played	a	‘central	role’22	in	the	conduct	of	
such	violence.	If	leaders	have	a	true	sense	of	belief	in	their	ideological	crusade,	and	can	distil	
this	on	those	around	them,	this	then	becomes	a	mobilizing	tool	of	great	significance.	Leaders	
may	be	able	to	use	mass	violence	to	strengthen	the	adherence	shown	amongst	the	populace	
to	a	nationalist	or	ideological	agenda	if	the	violence	is	targeted.	The	premise	is	that	if	personal	
security	is	shown	to	be	best	secured	through	expressions	of	ideological	conformity,	civilians	
are	likely	to	adapt	their	behaviour	accordingly.	
In	 Sudan,	 during	 the	 1990s,	 it	 is	 the	 role	 that	 Islamist	 ideology	 may	 have	 had	 in	
determining	leader	actions	that	is	of	most	interest.	In	1989,	following	a	bloodless	coup,	the	
National	Islamic	Front	(NIF),	came	to	assume	prominence.	They	promptly	began	imposing	a	
new	form	of	‘political	Islam’23	and	revoked	previous	moves	towards	secularism.24	Ronen	has	
discussed	in	detail	the	role	that	Islam	and	the	ideology	of	Islamic	Sharia	law	has	played	during	
the	Bashir	leadership.25	The	presence	of	conflicting	religious	affiliations,	particularly	along	the	
north-south	axis,	has	long	been	a	destabilising	force	within	Sudan.	Such	a	precedent	justifies	
the	inclusion	of	this	theoretical	interpretation.	
	
3.2. Outgroup	threat	
	
The	 second	explanation	views	mass	 violence	as	 a	mechanism	 for	eradicating	an	outgroup	
threat.	The	high	correlation	between	episodes	of	mass	violence	and	periods	of	civil	war	has	
led	 academics	 to	 discuss	 the	 causal	 link	 between	 the	 two.26	 It	 is	 understood	 that,	 to	 be	
successful,	 outgroup	 movements	 rely	 heavily	 on	 a	 network	 of	 civilian	 support.	 Mao’s	
infamous	 ‘drain	 the	 seas’	 approach	 to	 counter-guerrilla	operations	 in	China	was	a	 tactical	
response	 to	 this	 assumption.27	 His	 theory	 was	 that	 successful	 counterinsurgency	 tactics	
																																																						
21	See	Valentino	2014.		
22	Valentino,	‘Why	We	Kill:	The	Political	Science	of	Political	Violence	against	Civilians’	Annual	
Review	of	Political	Science,	(March	2014),	p.	97.	
23	Cockett,	Sudan:	Darfur	and	the	Failure	of	an	African	State,	(London,	2010),	p.	101.	
24	See	Gallab	2008.	
25	See	Ronen	2014.	
26	See	Licklider	1995;	Wickham-Crowley	1990;	Harff	2003;	Valentino	2014;	and	Kalyvas	2006.	
27	Mao	described	how	guerrillas	moved	amongst	the	people	as	a	‘fish	swims	in	the	sea.’	By	
removing	the	‘sea’	the	fish	would	subsequently	die.		
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should	 involve	 a	 premeditated	 campaign	 of	 mass	 violence	 against	 civilians	 living	 in	
geographical	proximity	to	a	rebel	military	movement.	The	aspiration	is	to	strip	the	guerrilla	
movement	of	this	essential	support	base	and	ultimately	achieve	a	successful	conclusion	to	
the	civil	war.	If	there	is	a	distinct	power	imbalance	between	the	incumbents	and	insurgents,	
so	that	the	insurgents	cannot	guarantee	the	security	of	civilians	who	join	them,	then	mass	
violence	also	serves	to	highlight	these	deficiencies	and	deprive	the	insurgents	of	any	future	
support.		
There	 is	 an	 ongoing	 preponderance	 for	 counter-guerrilla	 mass	 violence	 to	 be	
indiscriminate	however	there	is	debate	over	how	effective	this	is.	Downes	uses	the	example	
of	 the	 Second	 Anglo-Boer	War	 to	 demonstrate	 how	mass	 indiscriminate	 violence	 can	 be	
effective	particularly	against	a	relatively	small	population	in	a	contained	geographical	area.28	
Furthermore,	he	states	that	‘when	civilian	loyalties	are	not	very	flexible,	selective	violence	is	
unlikely	to	deter	people	from	supporting	the	rebels.’29	In	this	instance	considerations	of	cost	
may	also	play	a	role.	Indiscriminate	violence	is	arguably	more	cost	effective,	as	it	does	not	
require	having	to	maintain	the	complex	intelligence	networks	needed	to	conduct	an	effective	
campaign	of	selective	violence.30	However,	Kalyvas	has	catalogued	how	mass	indiscriminate	
violence	can	also	reduce	the	effectiveness	of	a	counterinsurgency	campaign.31	Kalyvas	argues	
that	mass	indiscriminate	violence	can	be	counter-productive	in	that	that	it	may	simply	serve	
to	strengthen	civilian	incentives	to	join	the	rebel	group.	This	is	because,	in	the	words	of	Mason	
and	 Krane,	 individuals	 ‘can	 no	 longer	 assure	 themselves	 of	 immunity	 from	 repression	 by	
simply	remaining	inert.’32		
The	Bashir	regime	appeared	to	have	been	able	to	quell	an	earlier	rebellion	in	Darfur	
in	 the	 early	 1990s	 through	 the	 employment	 of	 selective	 violence.33	 Taking	 this	 into	
consideration	Roessler	questioned	why	then	in	2003	did	the	same	regime	choose	to	employ	
																																																						
28	See	Downes	2007.	
29	Downes,	‘Draining	the	Sea	by	Filling	the	Graves:	Investigating	the	Effectiveness	of	
Indiscriminate	Violence	as	a	Counterinsurgency	Strategy’,	Civil	Wars,	(Vol.	9:4),	p.	420.	
30	See	Kalyvas	2006;	and	Downes	2007.	
31	See	Kalyvas	2006.		
32	Mason,	and	Krane,	‘The	Political	Economy	of	Death	Squads:	Toward	a	Theory	of	the	
Impact	of	State-Sanctioned	Terror’,	International	Studies	Quarterly,	(Vol.	33:2,	1989),	p.	176.	
33	In	July	1991	a	disenchanted	Fur,	Daoud	Bolad,	led	a	force	of	1,000,	predominantly	Dinka,	
soldiers	into	Darfur	to	protect	the	interests	of	the	Fur	people.		
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mass	indiscriminate	violence	to	deal	with	a	subsequent	outgroup	threat?34	For	Roessler,	it	is	
distinctly	puzzling	that	within	such	a	short	period	of	time,	Bashir	would	renegade	on	a	method	
of	 counterinsurgency	 proven	 to	 have	 been	 successful.	 This	 conundrum	 prompts	 one	 to	
wonder	whether	 there	were	 other	 factors	 and	motives	 at	 play	which	 brought	 about	 this	
change	 in	 tactics.	 The	dictum	proposed	by	Valentino	 that	 ‘although	war	has	 spawned	 the	
majority	of	violence	against	civilians	…	politics	usually	spawns	war’,35	leads	us	to	the	possible	
answer	of	this	puzzle	as	we	analyse	the	final	explanation	for	the	outbreak	of	mass	violence	
against	civilians;	that	it	is	the	product	of	an	intra-elite	rivalry	crisis.		
	
3.3. Two	theories	of	intra-elite	rivalry	
	
In	authoritarian	regimes	power	is	both	highly	concentrated,	but	also	highly	insecure.	There	is	
an	awareness	that	within	an	authoritarian	system	there	are	substantial	advantages	to	being	
in	 power.	 However,	 once	 in	 power,	 leaders	 do	 not	 benefit	 from	 the	 same	 protective	
mechanisms	 that	 are	 in	 place	 in	 democratic	 systems.	 The	 insecurity	 of	 an	 authoritarian	
leader’s	tenure	therefore	arises	from	the	real	or	anticipated	threat	from	rival	in-group	elites	
that	are	incentivised	to	overthrow	the	leader	and	occupy	this	lucrative	position	themselves.		
To	mitigate	 against	 such	 risks,	 political	 elites	 rely	 heavily	 on	 constructed	 pillars	 of	
support	to	protect	them	in	this	volatile	environment.	These	informal	and	formal	networks	are	
often	built	up	 through	a	patronage	 system	whereby	distinct	 advantages	are	bestowed	on	
those	that	demonstrate	loyalty.	A	lack	of	horizontal	interaction	amongst	political	elites	serves	
to	 heighten	 paranoia	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 shifting	 strengths	 of	 these	 respective	 pillars	 of	
support.	 As	 a	 result,	 elites	 become	 trapped	 in	 a	 constant	 ‘zero-sum	 game’36	 where	 they	
cannot	afford	not	to	commit	to	removing	their	rivals	at	the	earliest	opportunity,	even	when	
cooperation	may	be	in	the	better	interest	of	all.37	Roessler	and	Van	der	Maat	have	offered	
two	rival	explanations	as	to	how	incidents	of	mass	violence	can	be	linked	to	a	commitment	of	
having	to	resolve	a	heightened	elite	rivalry	at	the	earliest	opportunity.	
																																																						
34	See	Roessler	2016.	
35	Valentino,	‘Why	We	Kill’,	(2014),	p.	96.	
36	Ronen,	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Hasan	Abdallah	al-Turabi’,	Middle	Eastern	Studies,	(50:6,	
2014),	p.	9.	
37	Svolik	has	applied	the	concepts	of	game	theory	to	analyse	the	decisions	that	authoritarian	
leaders	make.	See	Svolik	2012.	
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3.3.1. Roessler:	The	Coup-Civil	War	Trap		
	
Roessler	 suggests	 that	 mass	 violence	 is	 employed	 in	 response	 to	 insurgency	movements	
initiated	by	 rival	 elites	 that	 have	been	deliberately	 excluded	 from	positions	 of	 power.	He	
explains	this	rationale	through	a	coup-proofing	theory	of	civil	war	which	is	as	follows;	‘given	
the	higher	mobilizational	costs	necessary	to	seize	power	in	an	armed	rebellion	than	a	coup	…	
rulers	 often	 hedge	 their	 bets	 on	 civil	war	 and	 employ	 ethnopolitical	 exclusion	 as	 a	 coup-
proofing	strategy.’38	Authoritarian	leaders	are	deemed	to	look	towards	historical	precedent	
in	determining	the	high	threat	level	of	coup	d’états.39	Coups	can	occur	suddenly,	and	with	
little	warning,	all	 that	 is	 required	 is	 access	 to	 the	 state’s	 coercive	apparatus.	 	 Enacting	an	
armed	 insurgency	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 requires	 substantial	 financial	 and	 human	 resources.	
These	take	time	to	accumulate	and	such	actions	are	nearly	impossible	to	keep	hidden	from	
view.		
Roessler	 argues	 that	 a	 policy	 of	 ethnopolitical	 exclusion	 is	 used	 to	 neutralize	 and	
remove	rivals	within	the	ruling	elite	so	that	undesirable	in-group	members	are	deprived	of	
the	 capability	 to	 conduct	 a	 coup.	 The	 accepted	 risk	 is	 that	 this	 could	 persuade	 them	 to	
instigate	an	“outgroup”	rebellion	in	a	last-ditch	attempt	to	halt	their	demise.	In	response,	a	
long	drawn	out	military	campaign	can	be	enacted,	and	the	authoritarian	leader	will	be	much	
better	 able	 to	 maintain	 their	 grip	 on	 power.	 There	 will	 be	 a	 higher	 propensity	 for	 mass	
indiscriminate	violence	against	civilians	to	occur	during	such	a	campaign	as,	in	marginalizing	
certain	elites,	the	regime	also	forfeits	the	regional	knowledge	that	their	pillars	of	support	can	
provide.	 Such	 informational	 deficiencies	 force	 the	 regime	 to	 ‘fall	 back	 on	 indiscriminate	
violence’40	as	the	only,	if	inefficient	means,	to	contain	the	rebellion.	However,	by	using	a	large	
set	of	quantitative	data,	Van	der	Maat	has	demonstrated	that	in	‘40%	of	the	cases’41	of	mass	
indiscriminate	violence	over	the	past	half-century	this	violence	occurred	in	areas	where	there	
was	no	perceivable	outgroup	threat.	Van	der	Maat	therefore	questions	whether	it	is	sufficient	
																																																						
38	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	99.	
39	See	Roessler	2016.	
40	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	57.	
41	Van	der	Maat,	E.,	Genocidal	Consolidation’,	(2015),	p.	9.	
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to	view	the	mass	killings	of	civilians	as	being	an	indirect	consequence	of	an	intra-elite	rivalry.	
Instead	he	proposes	that	it	may	in	fact	be	the	fundamental	mechanism	employed	to	resolve	
the	rivalry.		
	
3.3.2. Van	der	Maat:	Genocidal	Consolidation	
	
Van	der	Maat	argues	that	coup	proofing	mechanisms	such	as	ethnopolitical	exclusion	become	
redundant	when	 there	 is	 close	 power	 parity	 between	 elite	 rivals,	 and	may	 in	 fact	 have	 a	
counterproductive	effect	as	they	simply	serve	to	heighten	the	security	dilemma	and	galvanise	
previously	complacent	rivals	 into	action.42	 In	these	situations,	Van	der	Maat	proposes	that	
mass	indiscriminate	violence	is	employed	as	one	of	the	primary	mechanisms	to	resolve	the	
intra-elite	rivalry.	Van	der	Maat	posits	that	 leaders	use	the	 ‘shroud	of	mass	 indiscriminate	
violence’43	 as	 a	 veil	 behind	which	 they	 can	 enact	 necessary	 purges.	 This	 process,	 termed	
genocidal	 consolidation,	 is	 preferable	 to	 a	 policy	 of	 ethnopolitical	 exclusion	 as	 it	 is	 rapid,	
overwhelming	and	seeks	to	eliminate	rivals	entirely	before	they	can	form	a	viable	insurgency	
movement.	 The	 additional	 appeal	 of	 such	 a	method	 is	 that,	when	 properly	 conducted,	 it	
enables	the	perpetrators	to	maintain	the	initiative.44		
A	policy	of	genocidal	consolidation	can	be	incredibly	effective	because	it	forces	rival	
elites	and	their	associated	pillars	of	support	to	make	an	immediate	choice.	They	must	either	
decide	to	challenge	this	extreme	action	by	placing	themselves	in	demonstrative	danger	or,	as	
Van	der	Maat	puts	it,	they	can	‘keep	their	heads	on	by	keeping	them	down.’45	In	the	interest	
of	 self-preservation,	 less	 committed	 rival	 elites	 and	 their	 supporters	 can	 choose	 inaction,	
which	 is	 interpreted	as	passive	acquiescence.	Those	that	do	choose	to	resist	become	both	
increasingly	visible	and	isolated	which	further	facilitates	their	targeted	removal.		
Both	Roessler	and	Van	der	Maat	suggest	that	leaders	have	the	same	objectives;	the	
removal	of	their	elite	rivals	and	their	pillars	of	support.	However,	their	respective	proposals	
as	 to	 how	 this	 is	 achieved	 differ	 substantially.	 There	 is	 a	 clear	 difference	 in	 the	 causality	
																																																						
42	See	Van	der	Maat	2015.	
43	Van	der	Maat,	E.,	‘Genocidal	Consolidation’,	(2015),	p.	10.	
44	Van	der	Maat	details	a	four-stage	process:	1)	perpetration	of	mass	indiscriminate	violence	
by	militias;	2)	capture	of	local	government	and	security	institutions;	3)	neutralization	of	rival	
pillars	of	support;	and	4)	purging	of	rival	elites.	See	Van	der	Maat	2015.	
45	Van	der	Maat,	E.,	‘Genocidal	Consolidation’,	(2015),	p.	13.	
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mechanisms	of	their	theories.	For	those	who	have	eluded	to	an	elite	showdown	in	the	years	
1999	to	2001,46	it	is	Roessler’s	interpretation	of	the	link	between	these	observations	and	the	
outbreak	of	mass	violence	in	Darfur	that	has	held	prominence.	The	proposition	of	a	genocidal	
consolidation	paradigm	offers	the	opportunity	to	reassess	the	case	and	ultimately	to	provide	
a	more	considered	evaluation.		
	
3.4. Resource	competition	
	
Before	moving	away	from	the	theoretical	prescriptions,	it	would	be	an	oversight	not	to	pay	
homage	 to	 a	 debate	 that	 is	 synchronous	 to	 all	 the	 above	 theories,	 that	 of	 resource	
competition.	 As	 resource	 insecurity	 is	 a	 recurring	 phenomenon	 within	 Darfur,	 its	 impact	
struggles	to	account	for	the	specific	timing	of	periods	of	violence	and	consequently	shouldn’t	
be	understood	as	the	leading	causal	factor	for	these.47		However,	contestations	over	limited	
resources	can	certainly	inflate	periods	of	insecurity.48	
There	 are	 several	 theories	 which	 appear	 to	 offer	 a	 viable	 explanation	 of	 how	
competition	 over	 resources	may	 have	 helped	 to	 fuel	 the	 conflict	 in	 Darfur.	 Homer-Dixon	
proposed	in	his	environmental	scarcity	theory	that	‘scarcity	of	resources	…	can	contribute	to	
civil	 violence,	 including	 insurgencies	 and	 ethnic	 clashes.’49	 These	 scarcities	 can	 be	 both	
demand-induced50	and	supply-induced.51	Salih	has	written	widely	on	the	causes	and	presence	
of	scarcity	within	Darfur.	He	argues	that	both	drought	and	overpopulation	have	exacerbated	
the	tensions	over	increasingly	scarce	natural	resources.	52	In	their	econometric	model	looking	
at	greed	 and	 grievances,	 Collier	 and	Hoeffler	went	 a	 step	 further	 in	 proclaiming	 that	 the	
prospect	 of	 economic	 gain	may	 be	 one	 of	 the	main	 reasons	why	 violence	 occurs.53	 They	
subsequently	revised	this	all-pervasive	view54	but	still	deemed	that	the	prevalence	of	what	
																																																						
46	See	Prunier	2005;	Yehudit	2014;	Mahmoud	2004;	De	Waal	April	2007;	and	Burr	and	
Collins	2006.	
47	See	Salehyan	2008,	Ibrahim	2006;	and	Tubiana	2007.	
48	See	Sikainga	2009;	and	Ballentine	and	Sherman	2003.	
49	Homer-Dixon,	The	Environment,	Scarcity,	and	Violence,	(Princeton,	1999),	p.	177.	
50	See	Brunborg	and	Urdal	2005.	
51	See	Benjaminsen	2008.	
52	See	Salih	1999.	
53	See	Collier	and	Hoeffler	2001.	
54	See	Collier,	Hoeffler	and	Rohner	2009.	
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Collier	 termed	 conflict	 entrepreneurism	 was	 a	 leading	 explanation	 as	 to	 why	 episodes	 of	
violence	can	become	so	protracted	and	difficult	to	resolve.55		
The	situation	regarding	the	distribution	of	scarce	resources	in	Darfur	is	seen	to	have	
been	 further	 complicated	 by	 the	 conflicting	 demands	 of	 pastoralism	 versus	 sedentary	
agriculture	and	the	ensuing	issue	of	land	rights.56	Pastoralists	from	the	north	of	the	region	
have	 increasingly	 strayed	 further	 south	 ahead	of	 advancing	desertification	 and	 come	 into	
direct	 contact	 with	 sedentary	 farmers.	 Episodes	 of	 confrontation	 ensued	 and,	 with	 the	
introduction	of	modern	weaponry,	these	then	became	increasingly	violent	and	deadly.57	The	
resource	 issue	 had	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Hagan	 and	 Rymond-Richmond	 turned	 Darfur	 into	 a	
‘powder	keg.’58	A	spark	was	still	required	but	when	it	came	it	was	competition	over	resources	
that	helped	fuel	the	explosion.		
	
4. Research	Design	
	
The	 research	 objective	 for	 this	 study	 is	 as	 follows:	 to	 conduct	 a	 theory	 test	 to	 try	 and	
corroborate	which	explanation	for	mass	violence	is	most	appropriate	for	this	case.	This	will	
be	 achieved	 through	 a	 method	 of	 process-tracing	 using	 qualitative	 observations.	 The	
utilisation	 of	 the	method	 of	 process-tracing	 offers	 a	 comprehensive	way	 of	 conducting	 a	
within-case	 analysis	 as	 it	 necessitates	 the	 observation,	 and	 subsequent	 causal	 linking,	 of	
multiple	events	occurring	in	a	pre-determined	order.59	In	this	way,	multiple	variables	must	be	
satisfied	to	conclusively	substantiate	the	theory	in	question.	Process-tracing	represents	more	
than	 a	 historical	 narrative	 as	 degrees	 of	 selectivity	 must	 be	 made,	 and	 it	 allows	 for	
chronological	flexibility,	necessary	when	multiple	mechanisms	may	occur	concurrently.		
	 The	major	pretext	for	the	successful	utilisation	of	the	process-tracing	methodology	is	
the	presence	of	adequate	evidence.	When	conducting	an	analysis	of	an	authoritarian	regime	
such	as	that	of	Bashir,	this	presents	a	major	obstacle.	The	availability	of	primary	material	is	
limited,	and	what	little	can	be	accessed	must	be	treated	with	caution.	Furthermore,	owing	to	
																																																						
55	See	Collier	2000.	
56	See	Tubiana	2007.	
57	See	Straus	2005.	
58	Hagan	and	Rymond-Richmond,	Darfur	and	the	Crime	of	Genocide,	(Cambridge,	2008),	p.	
126.	
59	See	George	and	Bennett	2005.	
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the	intrinsically	personal	aspect	of	the	neo-patrimonial	style	of	politics	employed	by	Bashir,60	
an	understanding	of	his	 temperament	 is	necessary	 in	order	 to	understand	certain	actions,	
something	that	is	beyond	the	realms	of	achievability.	This	by	no	means	makes	it	a	fruitless	
enterprise.	 Ample	 secondary	 material	 has	 been	 published	 that	 presents	 the	 tangible	
outcomes	of	the	decisions	of	multiple	actors.	Many	of	the	pieces	have	also	benefited	from	
drawing	upon	first	hand	interviews	with	some	of	the	leading	protagonists.	Once	again,	the	
information	 that	 they	have	managed	 to	glean	 from	 these	 individuals	may	be	distorted	by	
personal	agendas	but	overall,	they	enhance	the	understanding	we	can	build	of	the	case.	It	is	
felt	 that	 there	 is	 sufficient	material	available	 to	make	valued	 judgements	on	 the	causality	
mechanisms	of	the	case.		
	
4.1. Observable	Implications	
	
The	 method	 of	 process-tracing	 requires	 the	 successful	 perception	 of	 a	 series	 of	 causal	
independent	variables	that	 lead	to	a	predetermined	dependent	variable.	 	Each	theoretical	
explanation	 for	 the	 occurrence	 of	 mass	 violence	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 defined	 dependent	
objective.	 Leader	 ideology	 theory	 determines	 a	 recognised	 strengthening	 of	 ideological	
consent,	or	at	least	passive	acceptance	as	the	dependent	objective.	Outgroup	threat	theory	
determines	that	the	destruction	of	an	armed	guerrilla	movement	is	the	dependent	objective.	
Finally,	the	intra-elite	rivalry	theories	determine	the	removal	of	elite	rivals	as	the	dependent	
objective.	Based	on	the	known	dependent	objectives	we	can	construct	a	series	of	expected	
causal	mechanisms,	 the	 presence	 of	 which	 would	 go	 a	 long	 way	 into	 determining	 which	
theory	best	explains	this	case.		
	
4.1.1. Leader	Ideology	
	
Let	us	first	consider	the	key	(non)-observable	implications	for	theory	one,	leader	ideology.61	
Firstly,	it	is	proposed	that	one	would	be	unlikely	to	observe	actions	and	events	that	suggest	
high	levels	of	rivalry	at	the	top	of	a	regime.	On	what	basis	is	this	assumption	made?	Due	to	
																																																						
60	See	Bayart	1993;	and	Reno	1998.	
61	This	will	be	referred	to	as	both	leader	ideology	and	‘theory	one’	in	the	remainder	of	this	
piece.	
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their	 contested	 claims	 to	 legitimacy,	 authoritarian	 leaders	 often	 find	 themselves	 in	 a	
perpetual	 state	 of	 low	 level	 paranoia	 and	 uncertainty	with	 regards	 to	 existential	 threats.	
Given	this	truism,	and,	if	authoritarian	leaders	harbour	a	degree	of	rationality	when	it	comes	
to	self-preservation,	it	therefore	seems	unlikely	that	leaders	would	take	the	substantial	risk	
of	brutally	 imposing	 their	 ideological	 vision	 ‘when	 they	are	 least	 secure.’62	 Leaders	with	a	
tenuous	grip	on	power	are	not	only	apprehensive	that	a	strong	reprisal	may	be	unleashed	by	
the	 targeted	 group	 but	 also,	 increasingly,	 from	 the	 international	 community	 that	 openly	
condemns	such	actions.	Alongside	an	absence	of	observable	threats,	one	should	expect	to	
see	 clear	 articulations	 of	 an	 ideological	 agenda.	 This	 could	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 new	
ideologically	based	legal	code,	the	publication	of	ideological	 literature	or	simply	within	the	
rhetoric	used	 in	 the	 leader’s	 speeches.	Extreme	 ideologies	can	be	politically,	 religiously	or	
ethnically	based.	
There	is	a	set	chronological	order	in	which	events	should	take	place.	There	must	be	
evidence	 that	 a	 leader’s	 ideological	 objectives	 have	 been	 clearly	 articulated	 before	 the	
outbreak	of	mass	violence.	Why	is	there	the	necessity	for	this	order	of	events?	It	has	been	
shown	 that	 the	most	 effective	way	 to	 consolidate	 an	 ideology	 is	 first	 to	demonstrate	 the	
desired	codes	of	behaviour	to	be	followed	and	then	kill	those	that	do	not	adhere	to	them.63	
Even	with	ethnically	based	ideological	beliefs	for	which	there	is	no	way	of	avoiding	retribution	
if	you	are	the	targeted	ethnic	grouping,	 it	has	been	shown	that	 it	still	benefits	a	 leader	to	
profess	such	ideological	agendas	before	enacting	a	policy	of	ethnic	cleansing.	This	is	because	
if	the	rest	of	the	society	are	made	aware	in	advance	that	any	association	with	the	targeted	
ethnic	minority	will	bring	with	it	significant	risks,	for	reasons	of	self-preservation	many	will	
choose	 passive	 acquiescence	 and	 distance.64	 Anticipating	 the	 possibility	 of	 personal	 gain	
some	may	even	choose	to	join	the	killings,	thus	facilitating	the	process.	The	final	observable	
implication	 therefore	 will	 be	 that	 a	 discernible	 pattern	 will	 be	 witnessed	 in	 the	 ensuing	
violence	 against	 civilians.	 Selective	 killing	 occurs	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 ideological	
prescriptions.		
	
	
																																																						
62	Van	der	Maat,	‘Genocidal	Consolidation’,	(2015),	p.	7.	
63	See	Bellamy	2012;	and	Valentino	2004.	
64	See	Mason	and	Krane	1989.	
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4.1.2. Outgroup	Threat	
	
Next,	 we	 take	 into	 consideration	 the	 key	 (non)-observable	 implications	 of	 theory	 two,	
outgroup	threat.65	The	first,	self-explanatory	observation	is	that	there	must	be	a	determined	
outgroup	threat.	Whether	a	military	movement	is	a	true	manifestation	of	an	outgroup	threat	
can	often	be	distinguished	by	the	demands	and	origin	of	its	members.	Guerrilla	movements	
in	authoritarian	states	often	emerge	 in	response	to	persistent	marginalisation	of	a	certain	
group.66	They	most	commonly	consist	of	members	who	come	from	an	ethnic	or	tribal	group	
that	 is	 politically	 underrepresented.	 Their	 demands	 include	 calls	 for	 some	 form	 of	
federalisation	or	at	least	greater	autonomy	and	self-determination	for	the	region	that	they	
represent.67	It	is	in	the	interests	of	such	groups	to	publicise	themselves	as	much	as	possible	
to	spread	the	reach	of	their	demands,	and	even	to	exaggerate	the	threat	that	they	may	indeed	
present	and	they	therefore	tend	to	be	easily	observable.	
		 In	addition,	theory	two	purports	to	share	one	key	prescription	with	that	of	theory	one:	
that	there	will	likely	be	an	absence	of	the	tenets	of	elite	rivalry	when	the	mass,	government	
led,	violence	begins.	The	premise	in	this	instance	is	that	it	would	be	highly	difficult	for	a	leader	
to	 launch	 an	 overwhelming	 counter-guerrilla	military	 operation	 of	 this	 nature	whilst	 also	
holding	a	loose	grip	on	power.	The	state	military	operaton	will	also	be	inherently	reactive	and	
will	be	anticipated	by	the	group	that	it	is	targeted	against.	This	may	reduce	its	effectiveness	
as	the	outgroup	will	have	had	time	to	entrench	itself	within	the	region	from	where	it	operates,	
leading	 to	 a	 long	 and	 drawn	 out	 conflict	 and	 unfulfilled	 conclusions.	 Unlike	 theory	 one	
however,	there	is	no	certainty	that	the	violence	will	be	selective.	In	fact,	it	is	more	likely	that	
it	will	not	be	as	 the	 regime	 faces	an	 information	deficiency	 in	 the	 regions	where	guerrilla	
activity	is	concentrated.	
	
	
	
																																																						
65	This	will	be	referred	to	as	both	outgroup	threat	and	‘theory	two	in	the	remainder	of	this	
piece.	
66	See	Collier,	Elliot,	Hegre,	Hoeffler,	Reynal-Querol	and	Sambanis	2003.	
67	See	Kaldor	2012.	
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4.1.3. Intra-elite	rivalry		
	
In	 a	 fundamental	departure	 from	 theories	one	and	 two,	Roessler	 and	Van	der	Maat	both	
stress	that	violence	against	civilians	is	most	likely	to	correlate	with	a	peak	in	intra-elite	rivalry.	
As	 this	 represents	 the	key	delineation	 it	 is	 important	 that	we	devote	attention	 to	what	 is	
meant	by	elite	rivalry.		
Although	there	is	always	a	degree	of	subjectivity	when	attempting	to	quantify	levels	
of	regime	insecurity	there	are	several	triggers	that	serve	as	useful	indicators	in	determining	
such	internal	 instability.	Firstly,	authoritarian	leaders	have	been	shown	to	resort	to	one	or	
several	actions	in	direct	response	to	either	real	or	perceived	threats	from	suspected	rivals.	
These	include;	declaring	a	state	of	emergency,	imposing	coercive	laws	such	as	martial	law	and	
stringent	 curfews,	 restructuring	 the	 party	 hierarchy	 in	 a	method	 known	 as	 the	 ‘revolving	
door’68	 approach,	dissolving	political	mechanisms	 including	 rival	political	parties,	 arresting	
and	executing	rival	elites,	and	oppressing,	and	attacking,	media	outlets.	This	by	no	means	
represents	an	exhaustive	list	of	observable	leader	actions	but	does	serve	as	a	sufficient	point	
of	departure	from	which	to	begin	investigation.		
The	actions	of	a	leader’s	main	rivals	also	serve	as	indicators	for	elite	instability.	These	
include;	attempted	coups,	the	creation	of	new	political	parties	and	the	formation	of	alliances	
of	 convenience	 between	 disparate	 rival	 groups,	 and	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 international	
diasporas.	Subsidiary	mechanisms	such	as	the	stockpiling	of	arms,	the	seizure	of	economic	
assets	 (state	 or	 personal),	 and	 the	 incitement	 of	 social	 unrest	 can	 also	 coincide	 with	 an	
environment	of	instability.	If,	through	the	course	of	the	case	analysis,	a	significant	number	of	
the	above	signals	can	be	observed,	then	attention	next	moves	onto	both	the	timing	and	the	
nature	of	the	violence	that	followed.	As	mentioned	previously	the	expected	order	of	events	
differs	between	these	two	theories.	There	now	follows	a	more	expansive	explanation	of	this	
to	clearly	focus	the	requirements	of	the	process-tracing	investigation.			
																																																						
68	In	politics,	the	metaphor	of	the	revolving	door	refers	to	the	movement	of	individuals	
between	different	roles.	It	is	a	tactic	commonly	adopted	in	authoritarian	regimes	to	try	and	
undermine	the	opportunity	for	a	rival	to	build	up	a	substantial	support	base	in	one	specific	
sector.	See	Thompson	2011.	
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The	key	distinction	of	Van	der	Maat’s	theory	of	genocidal	consolidation	is	that	mass	
indiscriminate	violence	against	civilians	will	occur	in	conjunction	with	the	purging69	of	regime	
elites.70	 It	 is	the	leading	mechanism	through	which	an	elite	crisis	 is	resolved	and	therefore	
would	be	expected	to	take	place	at	the	time	of	highest	tension,	when	many	of	the	above-
mentioned	 observables	 are	 also	 being	 witnessed.	 As	 this	 represents	 a	 calculated	 and	
premeditated	policy,	the	forces	mobilised	to	enact	it	will	benefit	from	having	the	initiative	
and	 will	 aim	 to	 keep	 this.	 Why	 is	 this?	 There	 are	 substantial	 risks	 of	 enacting	 such	 a	
mechanism	but	these	can	be	reduced	 if	 the	violence	triggered	 is	sudden,	coordinated	and	
massive.	Leaders	that	instigate	such	a	policy	expect	that,	in	the	interests	of	self-preservation,	
threatened	rivals	will	attempt	to	mobilize	their	security	networks	in	response.	The	ambition	
therefore	 is	 to	enact	 the	purges	and	reach	the	objective	of	 resolving	the	 intra-elite	rivalry	
crisis	as	quickly	as	possible.	
Apprehension	of	 the	 significant	 risks	 involved	may	dissuade	 leaders	 from	pursuing	
such	 a	 policy	 in	 all	 but	 the	most	 precarious	 of	 situations.	 In	 addition	 to	 Van	 der	Maat’s	
delineations	 this	 paper	 suggests	 that	 genocidal	 consolidation	 is	 only	 preferred	 as	 a	
methodology	over	ethnopolitical	exclusion	when	elite	rivals	are	too	powerful	to	be	side-lined	
by	other	means.	In	following	established	interpretations,	the	assertion	is	made	that	within	
authoritarian	states	power	conventionally	stems	from	control	over	the	security	services	and	
armed	forces.71	Taking	this	 into	consideration,	the	proposition	is	that	a	policy	of	genocidal	
consolidation	 is	more	 likely	 to	occur	 if	elite	rivals	are	understood	to	hold	 influence	over	a	
meaningful	proportion	of	the	army	or	security	services.		
Roessler’s	argument	suggests	a	distinctly	different	order	of	observable	events.	The	
elite	rivalry	crisis	is	solved	by	a	process	of	ethnopolitical	exclusion	and	therefore	mass	killings	
of	civilians	will	not	co-occur	with	elite	purges.	It	is	suggested	that	this	is	both	preferred,	and	
made	possible,	because	elite	rivals	are	not	so	easily	able	forcefully	to	resist	their	deliberate	
exclusion	due	to	a	lack	of	influence	amongst	the	armed	forces	and/or	security	services.	Unlike	
																																																						
69	When	the	author	refers	to	a	‘purging’	of	elite	rivals	the	intended	connotation	is	that	they	
are	in	some	way	removed	as	a	threat	to	the	incumbent	leader.	This	may	be	through	death,	
imprisonment	or	forced	exile.		
70	See	Van	der	Maat	2015.	
71	See	Herbst	2014;	and	Reno	1998.	
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genocidal	 consolidation,	 a	 policy	 of	 ethnopolitical	 exclusion	 risks	 provoking	 a	 secondary,	
delayed	challenge	as	rivals	are	not	killed,	only	marginalized.		
Roessler	asserts	that	the	link	between	the	intra-elite	rivalry	and	the	instigation	of	mass	
violence	will	be	an	indirect	one.	The	causal	chain	will	be	as	follows;	firstly,	there	will	be	the	
appearance	 of	 an	 “outgroup”,	 this	 will	 subsequently	 be	 followed	 by	 the	 instigation	 of	 a	
reactive	campaign	of	mass	indiscriminate	violence	by	the	regime	to	counter	this	threat.	The	
violence,	 once	 it	 commences,	 will	 most	 likely	 reflect	 a	 counter-insurgency	 model	 and	
therefore	could	well	be	confused	with	 theory	 two.	 	 In	determining	whether	 the	outgroup	
threat	arose	as	a	direct	result	of	a	policy	of	ethnopolitical	exclusion	as	opposed	to	being	a	
“pure”72	outgroup	movement	both	the	membership	and	demands	of	the	outgroup	movement	
must	 be	 assessed.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 prescriptions	 of	 theory	 two,	 an	 outgroup	 formed	
following	a	process	of	ethnopolitical	exclusion	will	be	led	by	the	recently	excluded	elites	who	
had	 previously	 held	 positions	 of	 authority	 within	 the	 governing	 system.	 They	 will	 be	
motivated	 to	 try	 and	 regain	 their	 recently	 lost	 positions	 of	 authority	 at	 the	 centre	 and	
therefore	there	is	an	expectation	that	their	demands	would	also	differ	from	those	of	theory	
two.	Rather	than	federalisation	or	regional	autonomy,	calls	for	changes	in	the	central	power	
structure	and	even	regime	change	should	instead	be	discerned.		
	
5. Case	Analysis	
	
This	paper	will	proceed	as	follows;	the	initial	focus	will	be	on	proving	the	emergence	of	an	
intra-elite	rivalry	within	Khartoum	in	the	period	immediately	preceding	the	outbreak	of	mass	
violence	against	civilians	in	late	2003.	This	would	lead	us	to	question	theories	one	and	two	
and	reinforce	one	of	the	two	elite	rivalry	paradigms.	This	will	be	followed	by	an	analysis	of	
the	 Darfur	 region	 to	 determine	 if	 and	 how	 this	western	 periphery	was	 connected	 to	 the	
situation	 at	 the	 centre.	 Finally,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 violence,	 the	 timing,	 perpetrators	 and	
outcomes	will	be	 taken	 into	consideration.	To	begin	with,	an	understanding	of	 the	power	
structure	 within	 Khartoum	 is	 required,	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 from	 where	 a	 viable	 elite	
challenge	could	emerge.	
	
																																																						
72	By	“pure”	what	is	meant	is	that	the	outgroup	will	draw	its	support	from	an	excluded	
section	of	society	who	have	not	previously	been	incorporated	into	governing	systems.		
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5.1. Defining	the	elite:	the	social	strata	of	Sudan	
	
De	Waal	states	that	a	‘persistent	fact	in	Sudanese	political	history	is	the	inability	of	any	one	
elite	faction	to	establish	unchallenged	political	dominance	over	the	state.’73	This	is	because	
the	core	of	the	country,	Khartoum	and	its	near	surrounds,	boast	adequate	economic,	social	
and	political	 infrastructure	 to	sustain	multiple	elite	groups.74	 In	his	work	 that	 looks	at	 the	
composition	of	the	Sudanese	elite	 in	the	ninety	years	preceding	Bashir’s	coup,	Woodward	
identifies	‘five	central	elite	blocs.’75	There	were	the	two	sectarian	parties;	the	Umma	Party	
and	 the	 Democratic	 Unionist	 Party	 (DUP),	 which	 came	 to	 dominate	 Sudan’s	 brief	
parliamentary	periods.76	Then	there	were	the	two	‘modern’	forces	of	the	civil	servants	and	
military,	and	the	independent	trade	unions	and	the	Communist	Party.	Finally,	there	were	the	
Islamists	 that	De	Waal	 states	 ‘emerged	 as	 an	 elite	 group	 themselves	 in	 the	 late	 1970s.’77	
Politically	this	grouping	came	to	express	itself	through	the	National	Islamic	Front	(NIF)	which	
superseded	the	more	limited	and	elitist	organisation	of	the	Islamic	Charter	Front	(ICF)	in	1985.	
	
5.2. 1989	coup	and	the	rise	of	the	National	Islamic	Front	and	Hassan	al-Turabi		
	
Despite	being	the	most	recent	addition	to	this	volatile	mix,	the	Islamists	benefited	from	being	
able	to	recruit	members	from	all	the	other	elite	factions	and	rose	to	prominence	rapidly	as	a	
result.	 Following	 some	deeply	disappointing	election	 results	 in	1986,	 in	1989	 their	 leader,	
Turabi	decided	instead	to	capture	the	Sudanese	state	by	force.78	On	30th	June	1989,	Bashir	
and	a	group	of	rebellious	army	officers	overthrew	the	government	of	Prime	Minister	Sadiq	al-
Mahdi	in	a	coup	d’état.	In	the	immediate	aftermath,	it	was	not	obvious	which	elite	bloc	would	
benefit	most.	 The	Revolutionary	Command	Council	 (RCC)	 formed	by	Bashir	 and	his	 fellow	
officers	 had	 ‘rounded	 up	 and	 imprisoned	most	 Sudanese	 political	 leaders’79	 including	 the	
																																																						
73	De	Waal,	‘Sudan:	The	Turbulent	State’,	in	De	Waal	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the		
Search	for	Peace,	(2007),	p.	4.	
74	See	De	Waal	2007.	
75	De	Waal,	‘Sudan’,	(2007),	p.	11.	
76	See	Woodward	1990.	
77	De	Waal,	‘Sudan’,	(2007),	p.	13.	
78	The	NIF	won	a	meagre	53	seats	in	parliament	and	only	two	seats	across	the	whole	of	the	
Darfur	region.	See	Cockett,	(2010),	pp.	96-97.	
79	Burr	and	Collins,	Revolutionary	Sudan,	(2003),	p.	8.		
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leader	 of	 the	 NIF,	 Hasan	 al-Turabi.	 And	 yet	 the	 preferential	 treatment	 that	 the	 former	
attorney-general	was	afforded	soon	became	clear	and	assumptions	began	to	be	made.	EL	
Afendi	states	that,	in	the	minds	of	the	Sudanese,	there	was	no	question	‘that	Hasan	al-Turabi	
was	the	philosopher	if	not	the	architect	of	the	30	June	revolution.’80		
These	suspicions	were	confirmed	upon	Turabi’s	 release	 in	December	as,	 through	a	
policy	known	as	tamkiin,81	a	full	insertion	of	NIF	members	into	upper	echelons	of	the	political	
strata	took	place.	The	newly	formed	‘Council	of	the	Defenders	of	the	Revolution’82	also	began	
imposing	an	Islamic	programme	on	the	country.	It	was	clear	that	the	use	of	Bashir	and	the	
military	to	enact	the	coup	d’état	had	been	an	elaborate	ruse	to	protect	the	Islamists	from	an	
international	 backlash.83	 Bashir	 and	 the	military	 leaders	 were	made	 to	 swear	 an	 oath	 of	
allegiance	to	Turabi	to	confirm	their	subsidiary	status.84	By	April	1991,	a	US	State	Department	
report	 proclaimed	 that	 ‘Hasan	 al-Turabi	 and	 the	 NIF	 are	 the	 dominant	 partners	 in	 the	
Government	of	Sudan.’85	Although,	Bashir	passively	accepted	a	puppet-like	role	in	1989,	this	
position	was	reluctantly	taken	because	he	had	no	other	viable	alternatives	at	the	time.	As	
Bashir’s	powerbase	grew,	his	relationship	with	Turabi	deteriorated.		
	
5.3. Bashir	versus	Turabi;	the	struggle	for	control	
	
De	Waal	 states	 that	 throughout	 the	1990s	ever-increasing	 levels	of	 competition	emerged,	
peaking	at	the	end	of	the	decade.86	A	point	of	departure,	proposed	by	Burr	and	Collins,	were	
the	 1997	 elections	 that	 returned	 Bashir	 as	 president	 with	 a	 huge,	 albeit	 undemocratic	
mandate.87	 Having	 been	 overpowered	 by	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 NIF	 and	 Turabi	 in	 the	
immediate	aftermath	of	the	coup,	Burr	and	Collins	suggest	that	this	symbolic	moment	was	a	
catalyst	 for	Bashir	 that	encouraged	him	to	confront	 the	speaker	of	 the	National	Assembly	
																																																						
80	El	Afendi,	Turabi’s	Revolution:	Islam	and	Power	in	Sudan,	(London,	1991),	p.	88.	
81	See	Ahmed	2007.	
82	Cockett,	Sudan:	Darfur	and	the	Failure	of	an	African	State,	(London,	2010),	p.	101.	
83	Secular	Egypt	to	the	north	did	not	want	to	allow	an	Islamist	government	in	Sudan	which	
may	offer	inspiration	to	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	movement	within	its	own	borders.	See	De	
Waal	2004.	
84	See	Cockett	2010.	
85	Burr	and	Collins,	Revolutionary	Sudan,	(2003),	p.	56.	
86	See	De	Waal	2007.	
87	See	Burr	and	Collins	2003.	
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head	 on.	 Taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 aforementioned	 list	 of	 observable	 implications	 of	
heightened	elite	competition	we	can	now	assess	the	validity	of	these	claims.		
In	March	 1998,	 First	 Vice	 President,	 General	 Salah,	 was	 killed	 in	 a	 plane	 crash	 in	
southern	Sudan	and	Bashir	took	advantage	of	this	to	spin	the	metaphorical	‘revolving	door’.	
Decisively,	Ali	Osman	Taha,	Turabi’s	 former	 ‘political	 son’,88	who	had	become	 increasingly	
disillusioned	with	the	agenda	of	his	mentor,	was	appointed	as	the	new	Vice	President	ahead	
of	the	Darfurian,	and	staunch	Turabi	loyalist,	Ali	al-Haj.89		
There	 followed	 a	 succession	 of	 constitutional	 manoeuvrings	 and	 power	 plays.	 In	
December	1998	Turabi	was	‘blindsided’90	by	a	secretly	prepared	memorandum.	Construed	by	
ten	leading	individuals	within	the	NCP	and	consequently	called	the	‘Memorandum	of	Ten’	it	
openly	criticized	the	last	ten	years	of	Islamist	rule	and	proposed	creating	a	new	Leadership	
Bureau	that	would	be	chaired	by	Bashir	and	would	strip	Turabi	of	his	powers.91	Turabi,	did	
not	 idly	sit	back	and	watch	this	process	unfold.	He	spent	the	first	half	of	1999	touring	the	
country,	mobilizing	support	and	seeking	reassurances	from	stalwart	NIF	members.92	Turabi’s	
residing	constitutional	power	was	demonstrated	when,	in	September	1999,	the	shura	of	the	
NCP	 rejected	 the	 reforms	 proposed	 by	 the	Memorandum	of	 Ten	 and	 instead	 ratified	 the	
establishment	of	a	Leadership	Authority,	 led	by	Turabi.93	Turabi	also	sought	to	reduce	the	
power	of	the	presidency	through	an	unexpected	democratization	of	the	shura.	A	new	law	was	
passed	that	would	allow	former	political	parties,	such	as	the	Umma	and	DUP	to	partly	re-
emerge	from	obscurity	to	broaden	the	oppositional	forces	that	Bashir	faced.94		
																																																						
88	Verhoeven,	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Sudan’s	Al-Ingaz	Revolution:	The	Transition	from	
Militarised	Islamism	to	Economic	Salvation	and	the	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement’,	Civil	
Wars,	(15:	2,	2013),	p.	125.	
89	See	Roessler	2016.		
90	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	158.	
91	See	Burr	and	Collins	2003;	Gallab	2014;	and	Roessler	2016.	
92	See	Roessler	2016.	
93	The	Leadership	Authority	would	comprise	of	sixty	members	loyal	to	Turabi.	They	would	
have	the	power	to	approve	the	nomination	of	vice	presidents,	ministers,	and	other	senior	
government	positions	the	appointment	of	which	had	previously	fallen	under	the	remit	of	
the	President.	This	would	allow	Turabi,	and	not	Bashir,	to	dictate	the	composition	of	the	
national	government.		
94	This	system,	labelled	tawali	al-sayasi,	allowed	parties	to	strengthen	their	positions	
through	the	formation	of	political	alliances.	
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	 Buoyed	by	the	apparent	ease	with	which	he	had	reversed	the	early	setbacks	Turabi	
sought	to	maintain	the	momentum	and	settle	indefinitely	the	confrontation	with	his	former	
protégé.	In	November	1999,	he	laid	out	a	series	of	constitutional	amendments,	that	crucially	
stripped	 the	 Presidential	 position	 of	 its	 hereto	 enjoyed	 immunity.	 This	 amounted,	 in	 the	
words	of	Roessler,	to	a	‘constitutional	coup.’95	For	the	first	time	the	NCP	parliament	would	be	
able	to	‘remove	the	president	with	a	two-thirds	majority	vote.’96	On	12th	December	‘two	days	
before	the	National	Assembly	was	to	vote	on	curbing	the	powers	of	the	presidency’97	Bashir’s	
patience	broke.	He	turned	to	the	one	body	that	he	could	count	on	for	unwavering	support,	
the	military.	 He	 ordered	 the	military	 to	 surround	 the	 parliament	 building	with	 tanks	 and	
soldiers,	summarily	dismissed	Turabi	as	speaker,	and	dissolved	the	governing	assembly.		
	 Further	 key	 indicators	 followed	 in	quick	 succession.	Bashir	 immediately	declared	a	
national	 state	 of	 emergency	 and	 imposed	 a	 strict	 curfew	 within	 Khartoum	 city.	
Simultaneously	he	‘purged	300	to	400	pro-Turabi	officers	from	the	army.’98	In	January	2000	
Bashir	 further	 reorganised	his	 cabinet,	 dismissing	nine	ministers	who	were	deemed	 to	be	
allies	of	Turabi.99	On	10th	February	Bashir	shut	down	the	Popular	Arab	and	Islamic	Congress	
(PAIC),	through	which	Turabi	had	previously	mobilized	a	wide	international	support	base.	In	
March,	Bashir	began	 to	confiscate	certain	business	 interests	and	divert	government	 funds	
away	from	Turabi	and	his	wider	family.100	In	May,	Bashir	allowed	Turabi	to	form	an	opposition	
political	party,	the	Popular	National	Congress	(PNC).	Turabi	saw	this	as	a	sign	of	weakness	and	
grabbed	the	opportunity,	but	it	was	in	fact	a	calculated	move	by	Bashir	which	enabled	him	to	
identify	disloyalists	and	continue	the	‘systematic	but	methodical	campaign	to	purge	Turabi’s	
sympathizers	from	the	regime.’101		
In	 a	 final,	 desperate	 roll	 of	 the	 dice	 on	 19th	 February	 2001,	 Turabi	 shocked	 his	
supporters	by	signing	a	memorandum	of	understanding	 in	Geneva	with	representatives	of	
the	 Sudan	 People’s	 Liberation	 Army	 (SPLA)	 guerrilla	 movement	 operating	 in	 southern	
																																																						
95	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	159.	
96	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	159.	
97	Burr	and	Collins	Revolutionary	Sudan,	(2003),	p.	270.	
98	‘What	Does	Bashir’s	‘Second	Coup’	Mean	for	Sudan?’	Mideast	Mirror,	(14/12/1999)	in	
Roessler,	P.,	(ed.),	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	160.	
99	See	Collins	2008.	
100	See	Collins	2008.	
101	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	pp.	160-161.	
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Sudan.102	 Turabi	 seemed	 able	 to	 overcome	 his	 convictions	 and	 his	 beliefs103	 to	 enter	 a	
cooperative	arrangement	with	this	group	to	coordinate	their	efforts	against	Bashir	and	the	
Government	of	Sudan.	For	Bashir,	an	 impending	fusion	of	Turabi’s	political	astuteness	and	
the	 SPLA’s	 military	 capabilities	 could	 not	 be	 tolerated,	 and	 on	 21st	 February	 Turabi	 was	
arrested,	jailed,	and	threatened	with	criminal	charges	for	‘communicating	with	the	enemy.’104		
Indisputably	Khartoum	was	experiencing	an	 internal	political	 crisis,	 the	 intensity	of	
which	 had,	 by	 February	 2001,	 reached	 a	 crescendo.	 The	 key	 premise	 of	 the	 theory	 of	
genocidal	 consolidation	 anticipates	 that	 the	 instigation	 of	 mass	 indiscriminate	 violence	
should	have	occurred	at	this	point	in	conjunction	with,	and	as	a	facilitating	mechanism	for,	
the	ongoing	purges.	And	yet,	crucially,	no	such	action	was	taken	by	Bashir	at	this	moment	in	
time.	Even	when	riots	broke	out	in	Nyala	and	El	Fasher,	the	capitals	of	South	and	North	Darfur	
respectively,	 mass	 arrests	 were	 favoured	 over	 state	 violence	 to	 repress	 them.	 Bashir	
appeared	capable	of	steadily	resolving	the	crisis	without	resorting	to	mass	violence.		
It	will	now	be	proposed	that	the	switch	of	allegiance	by	Taha	prior	to	the	peak	of	the	
crisis	 serves	as	 the	pivotal	explanation	 for	 this.	A	 combination	of	political	expediency	and	
personal	grievances	are	deemed	to	have	prompted	this	move.	Turabi	was	known	for	his	often	
‘insensitive	 and	 arrogant’105	 demeanour.	 He	 is	 reported	 to	 have	 ‘publicly	 humiliated	 his	
lieutenants’106	on	several	occasions	and	was	just	as	cantankerous	when	it	came	to	his	foreign	
relations,	increasingly	isolating	Sudan	with	his	abrasive	ideologies.	Consequently,	Verhoeven	
suggests	 that	 Taha	abandoned	his	 errant	mentor	 as	part	 of	 a	 ‘rational	 calculation	of	 self-
preservation	and	career	planning.’107	 	Losing	Taha	also	lost	Turabi	control	of	his	patronage	
networks	within	the	state	security	services.108	The	power	imbalance	became	insurmountable,	
and	 Turabi’s	 eleventh	 hour	 overtures	 towards	 the	 SPLA	 only	 lost	 him	 further	 credibility	
amongst	the	Islamists	within	the	military	who	had	remained	loyal.	Bashir	and	Taha	did	not	
need	 to	 resort	 to	 a	 risky	 strategy	 of	 genocidal	 consolidation.	 They	 could	 achieve	 stability	
																																																						
102	See	Flint	and	De	Waal	2008.	
103	The	SPLA	were	deeply	opposed	to	the	Islamic	project,	instead	seeking	to	protect	the	
rights	and	interests	of	the	oppressed	black,	Christian	south	Sudanese	peoples.	
104	AP	News,	‘Sudan’s	Bashir	says	jailed	opposition	leader	will	face	criminal	charges’	Abu	
Dhabi,	(20/03/2001).	
105	Verhoeven,	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Sudan’s	Al-Ingaz	Revolution’,	Civil	Wars,	(2013),	p.	124.	
106	Ibid.,	p.	124.	
107	Ibid.,	p.	125.	
108	See	Roessler	2016.	
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within	Khartoum	through	a	policy	of	political	exclusion.	And	yet,	despite	its	social,	political	
and	economic	hyper-dominance,	does	having	control	of	Khartoum	necessarily	correlate	to	
control	 of	 Sudan?	 There	 are	 some	 commentators	 that	 have	 proposed	 the	 contestation	
between	Turabi	and	Bashir	may	not	have	ended	in	2001,	but	 instead	was	relocated	to	the	
western	region	of	Darfur.109		
	
5.4. Islamism	in	Darfur	and	the	Justice	and	Equality	Movement	(JEM)	
	
With	his	efforts	in	Khartoum	being	frustrated,	some	have	suggested	that	Turabi	simply	shifted	
the	 power	 struggle	 to	 other	 theatres	where	 he	 held	more	 sway	 over	 the	 local	 populace.	
Prunier,	 states	 that	 from	 early	 2000	 onwards	 ‘observers	 …	 began	 to	 notice	 that	most	 of	
[Turabi’s]	close	aides	and	the	cadres	of	the	shabyi	party	were	from	the	west,	mostly	from	
Darfur.’110	 There	was	 an	 awareness	 that	 the	NIF	 had	made	 significant	 efforts	 to	 build	 up	
support,	 particularly	 amongst	 the	 Zaghawa	 and	Ma’ailya	 tribes,	 within	 the	 Darfur	 region	
throughout	the	1990s.111	The	actions	and	events	up	until	2001	may	have	simply	constituted	
the	‘first	round’112	of	a	much	longer	fight.	What	further	evidence	supports	the	suggestion	that	
the	situation	in	Darfur	simply	reflected	a	relocation	and	continuation	of	the	Khartoum	rivalry?	
According	to	El-Affendi	Darfur	was	a	region	 in	which	the	tanzim113	 ‘was	one	of	the	
most	fully	developed.’114	Traditionally	a	stronghold	for	the	Umma	Party,	when	the	NIF	came	
to	 power	 they	 sought	 to	 alter	 this	 by	 ‘redrawing	 administrative	 boundaries	 …	 [and]	 …	
mobilizing	the	support	of	new	clients.’115	By	1999,	many	‘party	officials	hailed	from	Darfur.’116	
Indeed,	the	deputy	secretary	general	of	the	NCP	and	Turabi’s	most	powerful	ally,	Dr.	Ali	al-
Haj,	was	from	South	Darfur.	These	Darfurian	Islamists	had	seen	the	NIF	as	offering	a	potential	
break	 from	 the	 politics	 of	 ethnicity	 and	 a	means	 of	 ‘overcoming	 their	marginalization.’117	
																																																						
109	See	Prunier	2007;	and	Cockett	2010.	
110	Prunier,	Darfur,	(2007),	p.	85.	
111	See	Prunier	2007.	
112	De	Waal,	‘Sudan’,	(2007),	p.	14.	
113	The	Arabic	word	for	the	Islamist	network	developed	by	the	NIF.	
114	El-Affendi,	Turabi’s	Revolution,	(1991),	p.	141.	
115	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa,	(2016),	p.	129.	
116	Ibid.,	p.	128.	
117	De	Waal,	‘Darfur	Policy	Forum:	After	the	Genocide	Determination,	What’s	Next?’	
https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-
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During	the	struggle	for	control	many	Zaghawa	Islamists	aligned	themselves	with	Turabi	and	
his	new	PNC	party.118	Bashir’s	feared	that	history	would	repeat	itself	and,	just	as	one	hundred	
years	previously,119	a	group	of	religious	fundamentalists	would	be	able	to	launch	a	successful	
assault	on	Khartoum	from	the	western	peripheries.120	
	 In	2000,	the	formation	of	a	militia	movement	that	subsequently	came	to	be	known	as	
the	Justice	and	Equality	Movement	(JEM)	served	to	fuel	these	concerns.	The	movement	was	
led	by	Khalil	Ibrahim	and	fellow	members	of	the	Zagahawa	tribe	branded	by	Salih	Osman	as	
being	‘disciples	of	Turabi’.121	There	was	speculation,	‘but	no	hard	evidence’,122	that	the	JEM	
was	 receiving	 financial	 support	 through	 a	 partnership	 between	 Khalil’s	 brother,	 Jibreel	
Ibrahim,	 and	 Turabi’s	 close	 confident	 and	 leader	 of	 the	 PNC,	 al	 Haj.123	 There	 was	 also	
speculation	that	around	the	time	Turabi	was	losing	his	grip	on	the	situation	in	Khartoum	there	
began	a	more	concerted	effort	to	direct	arms	to	the	Darfur	region.	If	the	JEM	was	a	violent	
embodiment	of	Turabi’s	support	base	in	Darfur,	the	mass	violence	meted	by	the	government	
of	Sudan	(GoS)	could	arguably	have	been	a	tactic	of	genocidal	consolidation	chosen	to	remove	
this	threat.		
However,	 the	 JEM	 is	 much	 more	 of	 an	 anachronism	 than	 this,	 and	 for	 every	
commentator	that	alleges	a	Turabi	link	there	is	someone	discrediting	such	claims.	Daly	argues	
that	 the	 JEM	 was	 led	 by	 a	 group	 of	 dissident,	 second	 tier,	 NIF	 members,	 who	 began	
collaborating	 around	 their	 shared	disillusionment	with	 Turabi’s	 Islamist	 project.124	 In	May	
2000,	they	claimed	responsibility	for	the	publication	of	the	‘Black	Book’125	which	was	highly	
critical	 of	 the	 systemic	 underdevelopment	 perpetrated	 by	 successive	 Khartoum	 regimes,	
																																																						
events/darfur-policy-forum-after-the-genocide-determination-whats-next	(22/12/2004)	
(viewed	on	18/06/2017).	
118	See	Roessler	2016.	
119	In	the	1880s,	Muhammad	Ahmad,	an	Islamo-nationalist	revolutionary	leader	had	
declared	himself	the	Mahdi,	or	chosen	one,	and	led	a	series	of	successful	military	campaigns	
that	eventually	overthrew	the	incumbent	Turco-Egyptian	rulers	of	Sudan.	
120	See	Flint	and	De	Waal	2008.	
121	Osman	in	Cockett	(ed.),	Sudan,	(2010),	p.	182.	
122	Flint,	‘Darfur’s	Armed	Movements’,	in	De	Waal	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the	Search	for	
Peace,	(2007),	p.	147.	
123	See	Flint	2007.	
124	See	Daly	2010.	
125	The	Black	Book:	Imbalance	of	Power	and	Wealth	in	Sudan	was	distributed	covertly	
around	Khartoum	in	May	2000.		
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including	 the	NIF.	Although	 several	of	 the	 JEM’s	 leadership	had	held	 regional	positions	of	
authority,	 and	 Ibrahim	had	at	one	point	been	 ‘head	of	 the	 tanzim	 in	Darfur’,126	 they	now	
appeared	to	be	attacking	the	very	system	which	they	had	been	a	part	of.	What	accounts	for	
such	contradictory	behaviour?	
Ibrahim,	and	his	followers	had	supported	Turabi	because	he	had	promised	to	develop	
the	western	states.	However,	loyalty	turned	to	disillusionment	when	it	became	clear	that	the	
NIF	 leadership	 had	 no	 intention	 of	 fulfilling	 these	 promises.	 With	 al	 Haj	 as	 a	 prominent	
exception,	many	Darfurian	Islamists	also	struggled	to	rise	above	second	tier	political	status.	
By	2000,	resentment	over	persistent	marginalisation	had	also	become	a	much	more	powerful	
recruitment	tool	than	Islamism	amongst	the	Darfuri	tribal	leaders.	As	a	result,	Ibrahim	actively	
sought	to	disassociate	his	movement	from	the	Khartoum	Islamists	through	repeated	public	
statements	to	this	effect.127	In	1998,	when	Turabi	was	still	the	figurehead	of	the	NIF,	Ibrahim	
stated	that	‘we	regional	people	…	have	been	very	disappointed	by	the	NIF.’128	Fellow	devotees	
declared	this	disillusionment	more	vociferously:	‘we	were	marginalised	in	Turabi’s	time	too.	
Turabi	is	nothing.’129	These	statements	may	of	course	have	simply	been	made	in	the	interests	
of	 pragmatism	 as	 the	 JEM	 sought	 to	 expand	 its	 support	 base.	 Bashir	 certainly	 remained	
doubtful	of	their	sincerity.	And	yet,	why	did	he	not	then	act	upon	these	concerns	and	unleash	
a	campaign	of	mass	indiscriminate	violence	within	Darfur	concurrently	with	the	systematic	
purging	at	the	centre?	A	first	strike	response	such	as	this	would	have	had	the	potential	of	
neutralising	this	suspected	regional	Islamist	cell	before	it	had	the	chance	to	mobilize	and	is	in	
line	with	Van	der	Maat’s	hypothesis.	Two	explanations	for	this	delay	are	possible;	1)	in	2000-
2001	Bashir	was	not	able	to	mete	out	such	violence;	or	2)	at	this	point	in	time	he	chose	not	
to.		
	
	
	
																																																						
126	Roessler,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power,	(2016),	p.	170.	
127	See	Flint	and	De	Waal	2008.	
128	Flint	and	De	Waal,	Darfur,	(2008),	p.	107.	
129	Ibid.,	p.	108.	
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5.5. 2001-2003:	how	and	why	inaction	was	replaced	by	mass	indiscriminate	
violence.	
	
Having	previously	been	one	of	the	most	advanced	fighting	forces	in	Africa,	by	the	early	2000’s	
even	presidential	adviser,	Ghazi	Atabani	was	describing	the	Sudanese	Armed	Forces	(SAF)	as	
a	‘lousy	army.’130	Years	of	increasingly	disappointing	campaigns	in	the	south	of	the	country	
against	the	SPLA	had	drained	the	military	of	both	morale	and	resources.	Perhaps,	in	late	2000,	
even	when	combining	 their	 forces,	Bashir	and	Taha	were	simply	 incapable	of	 instigating	a	
tactic	of	genocidal	consolidation	in	Darfur.	The	logistical	barriers	to	initiating	a	campaign	of	
mass	indiscriminate	violence	in	this	inaccessible,	peripheral	region	may	also	have	contributed	
towards	this	 incapacity.	There	 is	however,	one	significant	flaw	to	this	proposition	which	 is	
that,	just	a	few	years	later,	the	GoS	did	prove	more	than	capable	of	unleashing	a	campaign	of	
mass	indiscriminate	violence	by	co-opting	a	pre-existing	potent	force	within	the	region,	the	
Janjawiid.131	
The	Janjawiid	predominantly	derives	 its	membership	from	the	Arabic	Abbala	camel	
herding	tribes	from	north	western	Darfur,	who	have	periodically	clashed	with	the	sedentary	
tribes	to	the	south	over	access	to	land.132	The	term	Janjawiid133	itself	first	emerged	during	the	
unrest	 in	 the	 late	1980s	that	coincided	with	another	cyclical	period	of	drought.134	Military	
operations	 occurring	 in	 neighbouring	 Chad	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Libyan-Chad	 war	 had	 seen	 a	
‘flood’135	of	semi-automatic	weapons	pour	into	Darfur.	This	irreversibly	altered	the	dynamics	
of	these	regional	contestations.	By	the	late	1990s	the	Janjawiid	were	numerous,	well-armed	
and	more	than	capable	of	orchestrating	a	campaign	of	total	destruction.		
In	2001	however,	the	GoS	still	hoped	to	contain	the	emerging	unrest	and	was	engaging	
in	efforts	to	this	effect.	General	Suleiman	was	appointed	as	the	new	governor	for	North	Darfur	
with	instructions	to	‘calm	tribal	tensions’136	and	prevent	the	conflict	from	escalating.	There	
was	an	awareness	that	the	rebellion	in	1991	had	been	contained	largely	because	neither	the	
																																																						
130	Cockett,	Sudan,	(2010),	p.	184.	
131	See	Haggar	2007.	
132	See	Tubiana	2007.	
133	Roughly	translated	as	‘devils	on	horseback’.	
134	See	Flint	and	De	Waal	2008.	
135	Flint	and	De	Waal,	Darfur,	(2008),	p.	45.	
136	Ibid.,	p.	83.	
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Fur	or	Abballa	tribes	were	overly	inclined	to	mobilise	in	its	support.	Tensions	never	escalated	
and	 this	 enabled	 the	 Bashir	 regime	 to	 easily	 defeat	 it	 using	 selective	 violence.	 Roessler	
suggests	 that	 this	was	because	 the	 Islamists	had	 cultivated	 strong	bonds	with	 the	Darfuri	
tribal	 leaders.	 However,	 a	 more	 plausible	 argument	 is	 that	 apathy	 and	 suspicion	 arose	
amongst	Darfurians	because	most	of	Bolad’s	soldiers	were	SPLA	fighters	from	the	Dinka	tribe	
in	southern	Sudan.		The	movement	lacked	appeal	as	a	result.	Even	in	2002,	as	militia	attacks	
became	 ever	more	 frequent,	 Bashir	 formed	 a	 committee	 called	 the	 ‘Restoration	 of	 State	
Authority	and	Security	in	Darfur’	which	proceeded	to	‘detain	activists	on	both	sides’,137	Arab	
and	Fur.	The	highly	armed	Abbala	tribes	were	not	courted	at	this	point	as	the	committee	was	
aware	that	this	would	be	entirely	detrimental	to	their	efforts.		
Having	discredited	the	first	proposal	this	leaves	us	with	the	second:	that	Bashir	made	
a	 conscious	decision	not	 to	unleash	mass	 indiscriminate	violence	 to	neutralise	 the	 JEM	 in	
2000-2001.	This	hypothesis	 is	based	on	several	 factors.	Firstly,	Bashir	accurately	predicted	
that	the	Islamists	would	struggle	to	mobilize	support	amongst	a	local	population	still	deeply	
resentful	 of	 the	NIF’s	 policies	 of	 division.138	 Secondly,	 the	members	 of	 the	 JEM	only	 ever	
represented	 a	 collection	 of	 regional,	 second	 tier,	 semi-elites.	 Finally,	 with	 Turabi	 and	 his	
leading	supporters	in	Khartoum	already	purged	from	positions	of	power,	even	if	the	JEM	had	
wanted	to,	it	was	almost	impossible	for	them	to	combine	their	efforts	in	a	way	that	presented	
a	 direct	 threat	 to	 Bashir	 and	 Taha.	 In	 this	 interpretation,	 geographical	 distance	 and	
infrastructure	deficiencies	may	again	have	been	influential,	this	time	in	favour	of	the	Bashir	
regime.	Already	weakened,	could	Turabi	really	have	dictated	a	clandestine	military	operation	
in	a	region	with	negligible	communication	infrastructure	from	his	prison	cell?	The	logistical	
and	practical	difficulties	of	this	could	not	have	been	 in	greater	contrast	to	the	situation	 in	
1989	 when	 Turabi	 had	 of	 course	 been	 able	 to	 direct	 an	 acquiescent	 leader	 from	 his	
“incarceration”	just	a	few	kilometres	away.	In	the	end,	Bashir	was	finally	forced	to	expand	his	
military	operations	and	co-opt	the	full	support	of	the	Janjawiid	from	late	2003	onwards	to	
counter	the	emergence	of	a	second,	and	more	significant	military	threat	in	Darfur,	the	SLA.	
																																																						
137	Ibid.,	p.	84.	
138	The	Umma	Party	was	traditionally	the	most	dominant	political	force	in	Darfur.	They	won	
nearly	all	of	the	seats	during	the	1986	election	on	offer	in	the	region.	In	response	when	the	
NIF	came	to	power	they	tactically	split	Darfur	into	new	constituencies	with	the	intention	of	
splintering	the	dominant	Fur	across	arbitrary	administrative	boundaries.			
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5.6. SLA	and	a	reactive	counter-insurgency	
	
In	February	2003,	three	hundred	men	attacked	Golo,	killing	nearly	two	hundred	government	
soldiers.139	 This	 represented	 a	 symbolic	 and	 moral	 boosting	 victory	 for	 the	 rebel	 militia	
involved.	However,	it	was	not	the	JEM	but	another	newly	formed	rebel	movement,	the	SLA,	
who	claimed	overarching	responsibility	for	this	achievement.			
The	composition	of,	and	demands	made,	by	the	SLA	corroborate	with	the	observable	
features	 of	 a	 classic	 guerrilla	movement.	 The	 SLA	 represented	 a	military	manifestation	of	
Darfur’s	deep-rooted	sense	of	historical	difference.	Abdel	Wahid	and	the	close-knit	group	of	
Fur	 activists	 who	 had	 formed	 this	 militia	 body,	 saw	 themselves	 as	 the	 modern-day	
descendants	of	 the	 ruling	ethnic	 faction	of	 the	 former	 independent	sultanate.140	 	The	SLA	
were	adamant	that	they	were	disconnected	from	Khartoum	and	that	their	actions	were	to	
further	the	 interests	of	the	oppressed	Darfurians,	not	the	remnants	of	a	disillusioned	elite	
faction	from	the	capital.	They	called	for	greater	autonomy	for	the	Darfur	region	along	with	a	
more	even	distribution	of	state	resources	to	the	western	peripheries.141	
Furthermore,	 from	 the	 outset,	 Wahid	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 SLA	 leadership	 made	
concerted	 efforts	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 significant	 and	 entrenched	 guerrilla	 movement	
operating	in	the	south	of	Sudan,	the	SPLA	led	by	Garang.142	The	premise	for	collaboration	was	
that	the	members	of	both	groups	were	united	in	their	opposition	to	the	alien,	riverain,	Arab	
elite	in	Khartoum,	with	which	they	shared	no	affiliation.	Their	common	disillusionment	arose	
from	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 the	 black,	 African,	 Christian	 leadership	 of	 the	 SPLA	 and	 the	 Fur	
leadership	of	the	SLA	had	never	been	allowed	to	assume	positions	of	political	power.	They	
were	outgroups	fighting	for	freedom	from	the	oppression	of	a	system	over	which	they	had	
no	control.	The	assistance	provided	by	the	SPLA	to	the	SLA	was	not	insignificant.	This	serves	
as	testament	to	the	common	understanding	they	shared.		
																																																						
139	See	Flint	and	De	Waal	2008.	
140	From	the	mid-seventeenth	century	until	1916,	the	Fur	tribe	had	ruled	over	the	powerful,	
independent	Sultanate	of	Dar	Fur.		
141	See	Flint	and	De	Waal	2008.		
142	Wahid	had	sent	a	delegation	to	meet	with	Garang	and	the	SPLA	leadership	in	January	
2003	to	garner	support	and	advice	a	month	before	they	launched	their	first	attack.	See	Flint	
and	De	Waal	2008.		
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Whilst	the	JEM	had	struggled	to	broaden	its	support-base,	the	Fur	leadership	of	the	
SLA	was	much	more	successful	at	building	alliances.	This	is	indicative	of	the	contrasting	levels	
of	 appeal	of	 their	differing	 identities.	 In	2001	members	of	 the	Fur	and	 the	Zaghawa	 tribe	
swore	 a	 solemn	 oath	 to	 ‘work	 together	 to	 foil	 Arab	 supremacist	 policies	 in	 Darfur.’143	
Subsequently	 the	 Masalit	 were	 also	 persuaded	 to	 join	 the	 insurgency	 lending	 yet	 more	
strength	to	the	movement.	Members	of	the	Zaghawa	tribe	that	had	affiliations	with	the	JEM	
also	called	for	an	alliance	with	the	SLA.	However,	cooperation	never	went	further	than	basic	
logistical	support	due	to	suspicions	of	the	JEM’s	Islamism	and	what	this	symbolically	stood	
for.	 This	 broad	 rejection	 of	 any	 form	 of	 Islamist	 association	 again	 demonstrates	 how	
superficial	 and	 narrow	 the	 NIF’s	 pillars	 of	 support	 in	 the	 Darfur	 region	 were.	 A	 closer	
inspection	of	the	timing	of	events	further	supports	this	outgroup	threat	argument.				
The	 first	 meeting	 of	 the	 three	 young	 Fur	 activists	 who	 would	 come	 to	 assume	
prominent	 positions	 within	 the	 SLA,	 occurred	 in	 1996	 well	 before	 the	 intra-elite	 rivalry	
reached	 a	 crescendo	 within	 Khartoum.144	 And	 yet	 their	 ambitions	 to	 instigate	 a	 military	
insurrection	 remained	 dormant	 until	 at	 least	 the	 summer	 of	 2001.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	
mobilisation	of	the	SLA	may	have	been	connected	to	the	intra-elite	rivalry	in	the	centre	but	
not	 in	 the	manner	 that	 either	 Roessler	 or	 Van	 der	Maat	 predict.	 Simmering	 resentment	
amongst	the	Fur	and	other	leading	tribal	groups	within	Darfur	against	the	policies	of	divide	
and	rule	 imposed	upon	the	region	by	the	NIF	had	been	festering	throughout	the	1990s.145	
Following	the	split	in	the	Islamist	movement	at	the	centre,	these	disenchanted	groups	sensed	
weakness	and	a	potential	opportunity.	
The	SLA	activities	 at	 first	were	modest,	 they	 conducted	 small	 scale	attacks	against	
remote	government	outposts	 in	North	Darfur	throughout	2002	but	avoided	engaging	with	
any	significant	government	force.	The	newly	appointed	Governor	of	this	province,	General	
Suleiman,	brashly	declared	that	it	would	take	him	‘six	months	to	settle	the	situation’146	but	
made	few	coherent	efforts	to	pursue	this	goal	and	the	successful	attacks	continued.	Fatally	
underestimating	the	capabilities	and	resolve	of	the	SLA	militia	members,	Suleiman	believed	
																																																						
143	Flint	and	De	Waal,	Darfur,	(2008),	p.	82.	
144	The	three	individuals	in	question	were	Abdel	Wahid	Mohamed	al	Nur,	the	SLA’s	first	
chairman;	Ahmad	Abdel	Shafi,	the	SLA’s	first	coordinator;	and	Abdu	Abdalla	Ismail,	the	SLA’s	
first	representative	in	the	Ceasefire	Commission	headquarters	in	al	Fasher.		
145	See	Abdul-Jalil,	Mohammed	and	Yousef	2007.	
146	Flint	and	De	Waal,	Darfur,	(2008),	p.	83.	
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that,	being	incapable	of	launching	a	major	offensive	they	would	seek	negotiated	solutions.	
On	25th	April	2003,	he	was	proven	drastically	wrong.	A	convoy	of	thirteen	vehicles147	attacked	
the	air	base	at	el	Fasher	and	inflicted	greater	damage	to	the	Sudanese	air	force	in	one	day	
than	the	SPLA	had	over	the	course	of	twenty	years	of	civil	war	in	the	south	of	the	country.148	
It	was	only	following	this	incident	that	a	retaliatory	campaign	of	mass	indiscriminate	killings	
commenced	in	earnest.		
As	 with	 the	 JEM	 the	 GoS	 was	 aware	 that	 the	 SLA	 was	 forming	 in	 Darfur	 and	
squandered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 seize	 the	 initiative.	 Flint	 and	 De	 Waal	 state	 that	 the	
‘government’s	approach	was	half-hearted	and	incoherent.’149	The	contention	of	this	piece	is	
again	that	this	was	because	the	central	regime	had	already	been	consolidated	by	the	end	of	
2001,	 and	 Turabi	 the	 greatest	 threat,	 had	 been	 neutralised.	 Bashir	 was	 also	 complacent	
because	 he	 correctly	 discerned	 that	 the	 SLA	 issue	 was	 a	 Darfurian	 affair	 and	 could	 be	
contained	at	 the	peripheries.	The	movement	was	an	amalgamation	of	 individuals	with	no	
connections	 to	 the	 elite	 factions	 within	 Khartoum.	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 violence	 itself	 also	
appears	 to	corroborate	more	with	the	 interpretation	of	a	counter-guerrilla	campaign	than	
any	of	the	other	theoretical	prescriptions.	
The	GoS	quickly	made	the	realization	that	the	Janjawiid’s	tactics	of	violent	land	seizure	
complimented	 their	 own	 counter-insurgency	 methods	 and	 therefore	 could	 occur	
concurrently.	 In	 the	 words	 of	 Prunier,	 what	 transpired	was,	 ‘a	 very	 crude	 version	 of	 the	
‘strategic	hamlet’	policy	so	well	known	to	counter-insurgency	theorists.’150	Unprovoked	and	
horrific	assaults	by	land	and	air	were	conducted	against	civilian	settlements	deemed	to	be	
located	within	rebel	areas	of	influence,	that	forced	civilians	to	seek	refuge	in	IDP	camps.151	
This	 removed	 the	 human	 support	 base	 for	 the	 rebel	 groups.	 Furthermore,	 when	 both	
government	troops	and	the	semi-regularized	Janjawiid	forces	did	start	perpetrating	violence	
on	a	massive	scale	 from	 late	2003	onwards,	 they	appeared	to	make	very	 few	attempts	 to	
eliminate	the	leaders	of	either	the	SLA	or	the	JEM,	the	understood	objective	of	engaging	in	
genocidal	 consolidation.	 The	GoS	must	 have	 realised	 that	 in	 collaborating	with	 the	 semi-
																																																						
147	Only	two	of	these	vehicles	were	provided	by	the	JEM.	
148	148	The	SLA	forces	managed	to	destroy	five	military	planes	and	two	helicopter	gunships	as	
well	as	taking	the	General	captive.	This	represented	a	humiliating	blow	for	the	SAF.	
149	Ibid.,	p.	116.	
150	Prunier,	The	Ambigous	Genocide,	(2007),	p.	102.	
151	See	Steidle	2007.	
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autonomous	Janjawiid	forces	they	were	also	making	a	conscious	choice	to	forego	even	the	
remote	ability	of	targeting	the	violence.		
This	 preference	 for	 indiscriminate	 violence	 conclusively	 invalidates	 theory	 one.	No	
enduring,	 ideological	 proclamations	 had	 been	 made	 by	 Bashir	 prior	 to	 the	 escalation	 of	
violence.	In	fact,	with	regards	to	Islamic	ideologies,	in	the	wake	of	the	9/11	attack	Bashir	made	
concerted	efforts	to	enact	a	visible	U-turn	and	distance	himself	from	the	religious	project	that	
had	been	embarked	upon	by	Turabi.152		In	this	way,	Bashir	hoped	to	end	Sudan’s	international	
isolation.	There	is	also	widespread	evidence	that	most	of	the	civilians	killed	in	Darfur	were	
Muslim.	Witnesses	have	repeatedly	reported	hearing	Janjawiid	and	SAF	soldiers	using	racist	
terminology153	leading	some	to	conclude	that	the	violence	was	targeted	to	fulfil	an	ideological	
agenda	of	ethnic	cleansing.	As	the	SLA	drew	most	its	support	from	the	Fur	tribe,	its	members	
were	 disproportionately	 targeted	 by	 the	 violence.	 However,	 centuries	 of	 inter-marriage	
meant	that	people	of	both	Arab	and	African	ethnicity	had	come	to	consider	themselves	part	
of	this	tribe.	Furthermore,	as	the	violence	escalated,	spread	and	became	increasingly	chaotic,	
basic	opportunism	increasingly	came	to	surpass	ethnic	categorisations	as	a	justification	for	
killing.		
	
6. Summary	of	observations			
	
Having	 considered	 the	events	 and	perceived	outcomes	 surrounding	 the	outbreak	of	mass	
indiscriminate	 violence	 in	 Darfur	 it	 now	 becomes	 possible	 to	 put	 forward	 a	 proposed	
explanatory	 model.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 undeniable	 that,	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 a	 major	
internal	struggle	arose	between	Bashir	and	Turabi.	This	superseded	normal	 levels	of	 intra-
elite	 instability.	 In	 defining	 the	 level	 of	 elite	 rivalry	 through	 the	 perception	 of	 a	 list	 of	
observable	observations	this	has	led	us	to	conclude	that	this	rivalry	peaked	in	late	2000	and	
early	 2001	with	 the	 arrest	 of	 Turabi,	 the	 shutdown	of	 the	 Sudanese	 government	 and	 the	
imposition	of	emergency	powers.		
	 That	the	intra-elite	crisis	was	followed	chronologically	by	a	massive	and	widespread	
escalation	of	violence	in	Darfur	has	justifiably	encouraged	some	to	seek	a	connection.	In	this	
																																																						
152	See	Ronen	2014.	
153	The	Arabic	terms	‘abid’	and	‘zurga’	meaning	‘slave’	and	‘black’	were	said	to	have	been	
repeatedly	used	by	the	Janjawiid	forces	to	describe	the	victims	of	their	violence.		
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 36	
piece	two	leading	theories	concerning	the	relationship	between	intra-elite	rivalry	and	mass	
indiscriminate	violence	were	held	up	to	scrutiny;	those	of	Roessler	and	Van	der	Maat.		The	
proven	presence	of	an	intra-elite	rivalry	and	the	perpetration	of	indiscriminate	violence	both	
adhered	to	the	prescriptions	of	both	theoretical	paradigms.	The	distinction	between	the	two	
rested	on	whether	the	mass	violence	was	utilized	as	the	fundamental	mechanism	to	resolve	
the	crisis	or	whether	it	emerged	later	as	an	unavoidable	indirect	consequence	of	a	policy	of	
ethnopolitical	exclusion.		
	 It	 is	both	the	question	of	 initiative	and	timing	that	this	piece	argues	are	decisive	 in	
deciding	between	these	two	theoretical	explanations.	The	years	2001-2003	are	defined	by	
incomplete	information,	contradictions	and	speculation.	There	is	therefore	a	need	for	caution	
when	 reaching	 any	 concrete	 proposals	 for	 the	 mechanisms	 at	 play.	 One	 clear	 tenet	 can	
though	be	held	up	for	discussion	and	this	is	the	length	of	time	itself.	The	greater	the	temporal	
distance	between	the	peak	of	an	intra-elite	crisis	and	the	outbreak	of	violence,	the	further	
the	pendulum	swings	from	Van	der	Maat’s	explanation	to	Roessler’s.	Not	only	does	such	a	
time	gap	suggest	that	there	was	at	 least	an	assumption	made	that	the	main	threat	to	the	
regime	had	been	neutralized,	but	it	meant	the	initiative	moved	away	from	the	government	
and	gave	the	required	time	for	an	outgroup	to	form.		
Roessler’s	theory	of	the	progression	of	intra-elite	rivalry	to	outgroup	mobilization	is	of	
use	when	trying	to	explain	the	ambiguities	of	the	JEM,	as	it	not	only	pays	deference	to	the	
backgrounds	of	the	leading	cadre	but	also	accurately	predicts	the	sequence	of	events.	The	
Islamsist	leaders	of	the	JEM	following	increasing	marginalisation,	morphed	into	an	outgroup	
of	quasi-elites	before	they	began	plotting	on	how	to	resolve	this	injustice	by	force.	That	the	
JEM	 struggled	 to	 expand	 its	 support	 base	 is	 demonstrative	 of	 how	 the	 NIF	 had	 only	
superficially	managed	to	impose	its	Islamist	project	in	Darfur.	The	NIF	had	attempted	to	alter	
the	power	balance	within	Darfur	by	dividing	the	Fur	across	new	administrative	boundaries.	
However,	 this	 antagonistic	 more	 had	 clearly	 failed	 to	 overcome	 the	 primacy	 of	 tribal	
adherence.	As	a	result,	though	better	equipped	militarily,	the	JEM	represented	a	secondary	
threat	in	comparison	to	the	SLA.		
The	mobilisation	of	the	SLA	is	temporally	linked	to	the	intra-elite	crisis	only	in	so	far	
as	this	 instability	at	the	centre	was	seen	to	be	a	fortuitous	time	to	act.	Capitalizing	on	the	
recent	 insecurity	at	 the	centre	and	the	distracting	effect	of	 the	all-consuming	north-south	
peace	talks,	the	leading	Darfurian	tribes;	the	Fur,	a	large	part	of	the	Zaghawa,	and	later	the	
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Masalit,	formed	the	SLA	and	launched	an	insurgency	campaign	of	their	own.	This	spill-over	of	
regional	resentment	into	open	violence	was	just	the	most	recent	instance	of	a	cyclical	pattern	
of	revolt	at	the	marginalised	peripheries.	The	demands	of	the	SLA,	for	federalism	and	greater	
regional	autonomy	as	opposed	to	regime	change,	serve	to	further	delineate	their	outgroup	
status.	 Furthermore,	 that	 the	 SPLA	 and	 SLA	 quickly	 formed	 an	 alliance	 demonstrates	 the	
shared	understandings	they	had	as	two	outgroup	insurgency	movements.	
	
7. Conclusion	
		
An	overriding	issue	that	this	paper	encountered	was	the	levels	of	speculation	that	accompany	
any	assessment	of	the	Bashir	regime.	Even	those	who	have	conducted	extensive	first	person	
interviews	accept	that	extreme	caution	must	be	taken	in	evaluating	the	information	gathered	
this	way.	A	fundamental	difficulty	of	the	genocidal	consolidation	theory	is	that	it	purports	to	
be	a	rational	and	calculated	policy.	In	the	case	of	Sudan,	such	decisions	become	mired	in	the	
murky	waters	of	 contradictory	 rhetoric.	 This	 piece	 tried	 to	overcome	 this	 shortcoming	by	
focusing	 on	 the	 timing	 and	 nature	 of	 significant	 events	 alongside	 the	 statements	 of	
individuals.		
This	 paper	 set	 out	 to	 reassess	 the	 causal	 factors	 behind	 the	 onset	 of	 mass	
indiscriminate	violence	in	the	Darfur	region	by	government	forces	and	their	associates.	The	
necessity	 for	 such	 a	 reassessment	 was	 prompted	 by	 the	 recent	 appearance	 of	 a	 new	
theoretical	paradigm	proposed	by	Van	der	Maat,	the	premise	of	which	is	that	such	violence	
may	 be	 the	 calculated	 outcome	 of	 efforts	 to	 resolve	 an	 intra-elite	 crisis.	 The	 further	
justification	 for	 such	 an	 undertaking	 was	 shown	 through	 the	 observation	 of	 extensive	
evidence	of	an	intra-elite	crisis	having	arisen	shortly	before	the	outbreak	of	the	violence	in	
Darfur.	 Beyond	 this	 initial	 affirmation,	 the	 employment	 of	 a	 process-tracing	methodology	
generated	distinct	contradictions	with	Van	der	Maat’s	proposed	chronology	of	events	which	
undermine	 his	 theoretical	 assertions.	 In	 this	 instance	 purges	 and	 regime	 consolidation	
occurred	 without	 the	 need	 for	 a	 concurrent	 instigation	 of	 mass	 violence.	 However,	 in	
attempting	 to	 explain	why	 this	may	have	been	 the	 case	 a	 response	 can	be	offered	 to	 an	
unresolved	question	proposed	by	Van	der	Maat:	How	influential	a	role	does	shifting	power	
parity	between	elite	rivals	have	on	determining	whether	genocidal	consolidation	will	occur?	
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Van	der	Maat	called	on	future	researchers	to	determine	‘whether	leaders	that	are	in	
a	better	position	to	 leverage	…	security	structures	are	also	more	 likely	 to	adopt	genocidal	
consolidation.’154	The	evidence	from	this	case	suggests	that	they	are	not.	Following	the	re-
alignment	of	Taha,	Bashir	acquired	overriding	control	of	both	the	military	and	state	security	
services,	which	dictated	how	he	subsequently	confronted	Turabi	and	his	remaining	allies.	Van	
der	Maat’s	theory	leads	us	to	consider	more	seriously	contemporary	accounts	of	Sudanese	
who	 believed	 that	 Taha’s	 decision	 helped	 to	 avoid	 a	 bloodbath	 in	 the	 capital	 from	
occurring.155	The	proposition	is	that	whilst	Turabi	was	no	longer	able	to	instigate	a	successful	
violent	response,	Bashir	and	Taha	together	had	the	capability,	but	no	longer	saw	the	need	to	
enact	such	a	risky	strategy.	This	interpretation	should	help	to	inform	security	analysts	in	the	
future.		
The	recent	outbreak	of	mass	violence	within	South	Sudan	has	the	potential	to	further	
corroborate	this	evaluation.	It	may	be	too	early	to	conduct	a	full	and	representative	analysis	
of	the	events	in	Africa’s	newest	country	but	early	indicators	suggest	a	future	assessment	will	
have	 seminal	 value.	 Aware	 that	 there	was	 a	much	more	 balanced	 power	 parity	 between	
himself	and	the	now	former	Vice	President	Machar,	in	December	2013,	President	Salva	Kiir	
appeared	to	opt	for	a	violent	first	strike	following	what	appears	to	have	been	a	method	of	
genocidal	consolidation.		
A	second	feature	to	be	taken	from	this	study	which	merits	further	investigation	is	the	
potential	influence	of	geographical	distance.	The	remoteness	and	inaccessibility	of	the	Darfur	
region	from	Khartoum	may	have	been	of	underappreciated	significance	when	explaining	the	
delayed	 government	 response.	 Bashir	 could	 afford	 to	 be	 complacent	 about	 the	 emerging	
unrest	within	 the	 region	as	 the	vast	 size	of	Sudan	created	a	geographical	buffer.	Rwanda,	
Cambodia	and	more	recently	South	Sudan,	three	countries	where	methodologies	of	genocidal	
consolidation	have	arguably	been	enacted	are	all	much	smaller.	In	these	cases,	the	motivation	
to	act	decisively	and	quickly	may	have	been	influenced	by	the	proximity	of	the	threat	and	the	
knowledge	 that	 this	 lent	 itself	 to	much	more	 rapid	mobilisation	 capacities	 for	 their	 rivals.	
Interpretations	of	the	severity	of	the	threat	may	alter	as	elite	rivals	are	deemed	to	be	more	
easily	 able	 to	 link	 up	 with	 regional	 pillars	 of	 support.	 Equally	 the	 logistical	 barriers	 to	
																																																						
154	Van	der	Maat,	E.,	‘Genocidal	Consolidation’,	p.	37.		
155	See	De	Waal	2007.	
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conducting	a	successful	policy	of	genocidal	consolidation	are	reduced	and	this	may	also	 in	
turn	alter	the	opportunity	cost	ratio	for	leaders,	thus	encouraging	them	to	adopt	such	a	policy	
sooner.		
That	Bashir	resolved	his	power	struggle	with	Turabi	in	2000-2001	without	resorting	to	
a	tactic	of	genocidal	consolidation	should	not	lead	us	to	naively	assume	we	will	never	witness	
such	actions	 in	the	future	 in	this	perennially	 insecure	state.	Bashir	 is	ageing	and	there	are	
already	mutterings	of	a	possible	succession	process.	Since	Taha	left	government	in	2013,	it	
has	become	less	clear	who	would	be	favoured	to	succeed.	Bashir	himself,	has	understandably	
been	 reluctant	 to	 name	 anyone	 for	 fear	 of	 how	 this	may	 irreversibly	 undermine	 his	 own	
position.	As	Bashir	witnesses	his	military	peers	steadily	being	replaced	by	a	new	generation	
of	potential	violence	specialists,	his	previously	enjoyed	monopoly	over	state	power	risks	being	
eroded.	Bashir	may	yet	find	himself	challenged	by	new,	young	opportunists.	Given	that	the	
power	parity	vis-a-vis	Bashir	and	these	new	rivals	may	be	more	equal,	and	knowing	Bashir’s	
predisposition	to	resort	to	mass	indiscriminate	violence	in	the	past,	there	remains	a	distinct	
risk	that	Bashir	could	resort	to	a	policy	of	genocidal	consolidation	in	the	future.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Word	Count:	14,871	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 40	
8. Reference	List	
	
Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	Genocide,	New	York,	9th		
December	1948,	United	Nations	Treaty	Series,	(78:1951)	available	from	
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-
english.pdf.	
	
AP	News,	‘Sudan’s	Bashir	says	jailed	opposition	leader	will	face	criminal	charges’	Abu	Dhabi,		
(20/03/2001).	
	
UNICEF,	Darfur-overview,		
https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sudan_darfuroverview.html,	(viewed	on	
28/06/2017)	
	
Abdul-Jalil,	Musa,	Adam	Mohammed	and	Ahmed	Yousef,	‘Native	Administration	and	Local		
Governance	in	Darfur:	Past	and	Future’,	in	De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the		
Search	for	Peace,	(Harvard,	2007),	pp.	39-67.	
	
Ardenne-van	der	Hoeven,	Agnes	van,	Mohamed	Salih,	Nick	Grono	and		
Juan	E.	Mendez,	Explaining	Darfur:	Four	Lectures	on	the	Ongoing	Genocide,	
(Amsterdam,	2006)	(eBook	Collection,	EBSCOhost)	(viewed	on	18/12/2016).	
	
Ballentine,	Karen	and	Jake	Sherman,	(eds.),	The	Political	Economy	of	Armed	Conflict:	Beyond		
Greed	and	Grievance.	(Boulder,	2003).	
	
Bayart,	Jean-Francois,	The	State	in	Africa:	The	Politics	of	the	Belly,	(New	York,	1993).	
	
Bellamy,	Alex,	‘Mass	Killing	and	the	Politics	of	Legitimacy:	Empire	and	the	Ideology	of		
Selective	Extermination’,	Australian	Journal	of	Politics	&	History,	(Vol.	58:2,	2012),	
pp.	159-180.	
	
Benjaminsen,	Tor,	‘Does	Supply-Induced	Scarcity	Drive	Violent	Conflicts	in	the	African	Sahel?		
The	Case	of	the	Tuareg	Rebellion	in	Northen	Mali’,	Journal	of	Peace	Research,	(Vol.	
45:6,	2008),	pp.	819-836.	
	
Brunborg,	Helge	and	Henrik	Urdal,	‘The	Demography	of	Conflict	and	Violence:	An		
Introduction’,	Journal	of	Peace	Research,	(Vol.	42:4,	2005),	pp.	371-374.	
	
Burr,	Millard	and	Robert	Collins,	Darfur:	The	Long	Road	to	Disaster,	(Princeton,	2006).	
	
Burr,	Millard	and	Robert	Collins,	Revolutionary	Sudan:	Hassan	al-Turabi	and	the	Islamist		
State,	1989-2000,	(Boston,	2003).	
	
Cheeseman,	Nic,	Democracy	in	Africa:	Successes,	Failures	and	the	Struggle	for	Political		
Reform,	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2015).	
	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 41	
Cockett,	Richard,	Sudan:	Darfur	and	the	failure	of	an	African	state,	(Yale,	2010).	
	
Collier,	Paul,	‘Economic	causes	of	civil	conflict	and	their	implication	for	policy’,	The	World		
Bank,	(2000).	
	
Collier,	Paul	and	Anke	Hoeffler,	“Greed	and	Grievance	in	Civil	War”,	The	World	Bank	Policy		
research	working	paper	28126,	(2001),	pp.	1-32.	
	
Collier,	Paul	and	Anke	Hoeffler,	and	Rohner,	Dominic,	‘Beyond	Greed	and	Grievance:		
feasibility	and	civil	war’,	Oxford	Economic	Papers,	(Vol.	61:1,	2009),	pp.	1-27.	
	
Collier,	Paul,	V.L.	Elliot,	Havard	Hegre,	Anke	Hoeffler,	Marta	Reynal-Querol	and	Nicholas		
Sambanis,	Breaking	the	Conflict	Trap:	Civil	War	and	Development	Policy,	
(Washington,	2003).	
	
Collins,	Robert,	A	History	of	Modern	Sudan,	(Cambridge,	2008).	
	
Daly,	Martin,	Darfur’s	Sorrow:	The	Forgotten	History	of	a	Humanitarian	Disaster,		
(Cambridge,	2010)	
	
De	Waal,	Alex,	‘Darfur	Policy	Forum:	After	the	Genocide	Determination,	What’s	Next?’		
https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-
events/darfur-policy-forum-after-the-genocide-determination-whats-next	
(22/12/2004)	(viewed	on	18/06/2017)	
	
De	Waal,	Alex,	‘Sudan:	What	kind	of	state?	What	kind	of	crisis?’,	Social	Science	Research		
Council,	(April	2007),	pp.	1-27.	
	
De	Waal,	Alex,	‘Sudan:	The	Turbulent	State’,	in	De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the		
Search	for	Peace,	(Harvard,	2007),	pp.	1-38.	
	
De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),	Islamism	and	its	Enemies	in	the	Horn	of	Africa,	(London,	2004).	
	
Downes,	Alexander,	‘Draining	the	Sea	by	Filling	the	Graves:	Investigating	the	Effectiveness	of		
Indiscriminate	Violence	as	a	Counterinsurgency	Strategy’,	Civil	Wars,	(Vol.	9:4),	pp.	
420-444.	
	
El-Din,	Ahmed,	‘Islam	and	Islamism	in	Darfur’,	in	De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the		
Search	for	Peace,	(Harvard,	2007),	pp.	92-112.	
	
Fearon,	James	and	David	Laitin,	‘Ethnicity,	Insurgency	and	Civil	War’,	American	Political		
Science	Review,	(Vol.	97:	1,	2003),	pp.	75-90.	
	
Flint,	Julie,	‘Darfur’s	Armed	Movements’,	in	De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the		
Search	for	Peace,	(Harvard,	2007),	pp.	140-172.	
	
Flint,	Julie	and	Alex	De	Waal,	Darfur:	a	new	history	of	a	long	war,	(London,	2008).	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 42	
	
Gallab,	Abdullahi,	The	First	Islamic	Republic:	Development	and	Disintegration	of	Islamism	in		
the	Sudan,	(New	York,	2008).	
	
Gallab,	Abdullahi,	Their	Second	Republic:	Islamism	in	the	Sudan	from	disintegration	to		
oblivion,	(New	York,	2014).	
	
George,	Alexander	and	Andrew	Bennett,	Case	Studies	and	Theory	Development	in	the	Social		
Sciences,	(Cambridge,	2005).	
	
Hagan,	John	and	Wenona	Rymond-Richmond,	Darfur	and	the	Crime	of	Genocide,		
(Cambridge,	2008).	
	
Haggar,	Ali,	‘The	Origins	and	Organization	of	the	Janjawiid	in	Darfur’,	in	De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),		
War	in	Darfur	and	the	Search	for	Peace,	(Harvard,	2007),	pp.	113-139.	
	
Harf,	Barbara,	‘No	Lessons	Learned	from	the	Holocaust?	Assessing	Risks	of	Genocide	and		
Political	Mass	Murder	since	1955’,	American	Political	Science	Review,	(Vol.	97:1,	
2003),	pp.	57-73.	
	
Herbst,	Jeffrey,	States	and	Power	in	Africa	Comparative	Lessons	in	Authority	and	Control,		
(Princeton,	2014).		
	
Kaldor,	Mary,	New	and	old	wars:	organized	violence	in	a	global	era,	(Cambridge,	2012).	
	
Kalyvas,	Stathis,	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War,	(Cambridge,	2006).	
	
Kaplan,	Robert,	Balkan	Ghosts:	A	Journey	Through	History,	(New	York,	1993).	
	
Licklider,	Roy,	‘The	Consequences	of	Negotiated	Settlements	in	Civil	Wars,	1945-1993’,		
American	Political	Science	Review,	(Vol.	89:3,	1995),	pp.	681-690.	
	
Mahmoud,	Mahgoub,	‘Inside	Darfur:	Ethnic	Genocide	by	a	Governance	Crisis’,	Comparative		
Studies	of	South	Asia,	Africa	and	the	Middle	East,	(Vol.	24:2,	2004),	pp.	3-17.	
	
Mason,	David	and	Dale	Krane,	‘The	Political	Economy	of	Death	Squads:	Toward	a	Theory	of		
the	Impact	of	State-Sanctioned	Terror’,	International	Studies	Quarterly,	(Vol.	33:2,	
1989),	pp.	175-198.	
	
Prunier,	Gerard,	Darfur:	The	Ambiguous	Genocide,	(New	York,	2007).	
	
Reeves,	Eric,	A	Long	Day’s	Dying:	Critical	Moments	in	the	Darfur	Genocide,	(Toronto,	2007).	
	
Reno,	William,	Warlord	Politics	and	African	States,	(Colorado,	1998).	
	
Roessler,	Philip,	Ethnic	Politics	and	State	Power	in	Africa:	The	Logic	of	the	Coup-Civil	War		
Trap,	(Cambridge,	2016).	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 43	
	
Ronen,	Yehudit,	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Hasan	Abdallah	al-Turabi:	A	Unique	Chapter	in	Sudan’s		
Political	History	(1989-99)’,	Middle	Eastern	Studies,	(50:6,	2014),	pp.	992-1005.	
	
Rummel,	Rudolph,	‘Power,	Genocide	and	Mass	Murder’,	Journal	of	Peace	Research,	(Vol.		
31:1,	1994),	pp.	1-10.	
	
Salehyan,	Idean,	“From	Climate	Change	to	Conflict?	No	Consensus	Yet”	Journal	of	Peace		
Research,	(Vol.	45:3,	2008),	pp.	315-326.	
	
Salih,	Mohamed,	Environmental	Politics	and	Liberation	in	Contemporary	Africa,		
(Dordrecht	and	Boston,	1999).	
	
Sauve,	Chelsea,	‘One	at	a	Time:	The	Forgotten	Genocide	in	Darfur’,	Africa,	Foreign	Affairs,		
http://mindthismagazine.com/one-at-a-time-the-forgotten-genocide-in-darfur/	
(02/04/2015)	(viewed	on	07/11/2016).	
	
Sikainga,	Ahmand,	‘The	World’s	Worst	Humanitarian	Crisis’:	Understanding	the	Darfur		
Conflict’	Origins:	Current	Events	in	Historical	Perspective,	(2:5,	2009),	pp.	1-12.	
	
Steidle,	Brian	and	Gretchen	Wallace,	The	Devil	Came	on	Horseback:	Bearing	Witness	to		
the	Genocide	in	Darfur,	(New	York,	2007).	
	
Straus,	Scott,	‘Darfur	and	the	Genocide	Debate’,	Foreign	Affairs,	(84:1,	2005),	pp.		
123-133.	
	
Svolik,	Milan,	The	Politics	of	Authoritarian	Rule,	(Cambridge,	2012).		
	
Thompson,	Alex,	An	Introduction	to	African	Politics,	(London,	2011).	
	
Tubiana,	Jerome,	‘Darfur:	A	War	for	Land?’	in	De	Waal,	Alex	(ed.),	War	in	Darfur	and	the		
Search	for	Peace,	(Harvard,	2007),	pp.	68-91.	
	
Valentino,	Benjamin,	Final	Solutions:	Mass	Killing	and	Genocide	in	the	Twentieth	Century,		
(Ithaca,	2004).		
	
Valentino,	Benjamin,	‘Why	we	kill:	The	political	science	of	political	violence	against		
civilians’,	Annual	Review	of	Political	Science,	(17:89,	2014),	pp.	89-103.	
	
Van	de	Maat,	Eelco,	‘Genocidal	Consolidation:	Final	Solutions	to	Elite	Rivalry’,	(2015),		
(available	at	http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665673)		pp.	1-44.	
	
Verhoeven,	Harry,	‘The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Sudan’s	Al-Ingaz	Revolution:	The	Transition	from		
Militarised	Islamism	to	Economic	Salvation	and	the	Comprehensive	Peace	
Agreement’,	Civil	Wars,	(Vol.	15:	2,	2013),	pp.	118-140.	
	
	
S1893769	 	 07/07/2017	
	 44	
Wickham-Crowley,	Timothy,	‘Terror	and	guerrilla	warfare	in	Latin	America,	1956-1970’,		
Comparative	Studies	of	Social	History,	(Vol.	32:	2),	pp.	201-237.	
	
Woodward,	Peter,	Sudan	1898-1989:	The	Unstable	State,	(London,	1990).	
